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In The Empirical Stance, Bas C. van Fraassen suggests that philosophical positions include non-factual 
things like values and attitudes: they are "stances" rather than factual theses. Choosing between 
stances is not a matter of reason or rational compulsion; rather, we choose the stance that best 
reflects or expresses our values. For Dien Ho and Anja Jauernig, however, this reduces philosophy to 
a subjective expression of personal preference (subjectivism) and, moreover, reduces philosophical 
debate to an irresolvable value-based dispute (relativism). 
In this dissertation, I offer an intersubjective reading of van Fraassen. In doing so, I seek to extend 
what I think is an underdeveloped appeal to community in his work. Approaching van Fraassen with 
reference to community helps us to appreciate better his position (comprising his voluntarism and 
voluntarist epistemology, permissive rationality, and stance philosophy) and, as I hope to show, to 
respond to subjectivist and relativist concerns.  
In developing this community-based account, I first consider Brandom's model of reciprocal 
recognition. This gives us an understanding of stance choice as a process of mutually recognising and 
committing to particular values and attitudes. In choosing the empirical stance, say, I recognise and 
commit to the values of the mpiricist community. In turn, this community recognises my 
commitment and acknowledges me as an empiricist, as an adherent of the empirical stance. In 
Brandom's model, then, we find an account of stance choice as a community matter rather than 
something purely subjective. 
This leaves the relativist issue unresolved: how can we defend our stance choice to another 
community, whose members perhaps do not share our relevant values? In addressing this, I consider 
Davidson's radical interpretation and his principle of charity. As Davidson shows us, if we want to 
interpret (and hence communicate with) another being, we must assume a shared background of 












beliefs but also things like values and commitments. In this way, if I want to communicate with 
someone from another community, if I want to defend my values and stance choice to this being, 
then I must charitably assume that we share a common background of beliefs and values. At the 
very least, broadening the principle helps us to make further sense of van Fraassen's own response 
to Ho's relativist fears.  
Lastly I consider the epistemic issue of scientific and conceptual revolutions, in particular of the 
radical changes that are involved, in the context of community. I look at the role of emotion in van 
Fraassen's voluntarism and its connection to his notion of the "unfollowable rule". I suggest that 
further reflection on this connection might help us to make sense of drastic and emotional changes 
in perspective as a matter of community, since the unfollowable rule itself is community-based.  
As I hope to show, then, much light can be thrown upon van Fraassen The Empirical Stance by 
considering in detail the role of community and the theme of intersubjectivity in his work. This helps 
us to appreciate his position and offers him a genuine and detailed way to respond to the twin 












1.) Voluntarism and values 
So here is the proposal: a philosophical position can consist in something other than 
a belief in what the world is like (van Fraassen, 2002, 47) 
For Bas C. van Fraassen, a philosophical position extends beyond the purely factual realm to include 
things like values, attitudes, and commitments. This is not unique to philosophy, either. On van 
Fraassen's voluntarist account of epistemology, all claims to knowledge (our beliefs and scientific 
theories, our views of the world) are to some extent a reflection of our values and attitudes. Van 
Fraassen's suggestion brings worries of subjectivism, since it risks reducing our philosophical claims 
to subjective expressions of personal preference. Moreover, if our claims reflect our values in this 
way, then it is difficult to see how we might discuss our claims and choices with others who perhaps 
do not share these values. This is a worry of relativism. As a result of the twin issues of subjectivism 
and relativism, van Fraassen's voluntarist position threatens the p ssibility of meaningful or 
philosophical debate and undermines philosophy itself. As such, his proposal fails to appeal.  
In defence of van Fraassen, I suggest that within his voluntarist epistemology we can read an 
account of community and social norms that offers some refuge from these subjectivist and relativist 
fears. I approach this in three parts. First, I look at van Fraassen's position and the subjectivist and 
relativist issues it raises. Secondly, in response to these issues, I identify and elaborate an 
underdeveloped role for community in van Fraassen's epistemology and address the worry of 
community relativism. Finally, I consider the role of community in relation to scientific and 
conceptual revolutions, which are a central focus for van Fraassen. 
1.1) Stance philosophy, empiricism, and voluntarist epistemology 
The element of personal decision, values, and volition has entered and received a 
legitimate place in our epistemic life (van Fraassen, 2002, 91) 
In this chapter I look at van Fraassen's position and the subjectivist anxieties it raises. Central to his 
position is the idea that a philosophical position can be "something other" than a purely factual 
thesis (van Fraassen, 2002, 47). This "something other" is a philosophical stance: an "attitude, 
commitment, a cluster of such", which "may involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot 
simply be equated with having beliefs or making assertions about what there is" (van Fraassen, 












empirical stance1 – as an alternative to metaphysics.2 Understood as a stance, empiricism is 
characterised by a certain attitude towards science. For the empiricist, that is, science represents a 
"paradigm of rational inquiry" (van Fraassen, 2002, 63). This relates not so much to the content of 
scientific theories, but to the practice of science, which for the empiricist "teaches us how to give up 
our beliefs" (van Fraassen, 2002, 63). As we shall see, the empiricist's admiration of science is 
something that extends beyond the realm of belief; hence the need for empiricism as a stance rather 
than a factual thesis.  Moreover this admiration manifests most strongly in the area of epistemology 
- the "central philosophical concern" of the empiricist tradition - and as such van Fraassen 
concentrates his discussion on what is a predominant issue in epistemology: making sense of 
scientific and conceptual revolutions (2002, 64).  
Examples of scientific revolutions include the shift from Ptolemaic theories to the heliocentric 
cosmology of Copernicus, the fall of phlogiston in the face of Lavoisier's combustion theory, and 
more recently, Einstein's relativistic revolution. From an epistemological perspective,  these 
happenings pose a challenge in that they involve seemingly irrational changes in scientific belief. 
Consider the relativistic revolution. For a classical Newtonian physicist, the idea that mass is 
dependent upon velocity is preposterous. Coming to accept relativity theory, then, involves coming 
to accept something that is - from his current perspective - utterly absurd; this is a seemingly 
irrational jump. It is only after the fact that we can make sense of the shift from classical to 
relativistic physics. The epistemological issue here is two-fold: from the prior perspective, how do we 
account for our absurd epistemic choices and, from the posterior perspective, how do we 
retrospectively accommodate these choices as rational and in so doing, legitimate our current 
epistemic position.  
In addressing this issue, van Fraassen makes a distinction between what he calls objectifying 
epistemology and his own voluntarist epistemology. For van Fraassen, objectifying epistemology is 
"a factual theory writing project about cognitive functioning" that produces "theories with clear 
empirical content [...] constructed in the framework of the accepted science of the day" (2002, 76). 
For objectifying epistemology then, as van Fraassen sees it, scientific and conceptual revolutions 
                                                 
1
 There is some concern about a possible distinction between what is an empiric al stance and what is an 
empiricist stance (see van Fraassen (2004) and Anja Jauernig (2007)). For our part, however, we shall follow 
the terminology in van Fraassen's The Empirical  Stance. 
2
 Indeed, van Fraassen dismisses traditional 'naive' empiricism (2002, 42), since it is only as a stance that he 
thinks empiricism can offer a coherent alternative to metaphysics; however it is beyond the scope of our  
discussion to detail  van Fraassen's dismissal of traditional empiricism and his characterisation of metaphysics. 
(Here the reader is directed to Chakravartty (2004, 2007) and Jauernig (2007) among others). Nevertheless, we 
should note that what I am interested in, and what I seek to defend - van Fraassen's voluntarism - has some 
bearing on his attack of metaphysics. In fact, if we cannot defend van Fraassen's voluntarism against 












present an "unsolvable problem" (2002, 81). This is because any descriptive, factual theory about 
our cognitive functioning will be inferred from current psychological or scientific theories that 
encompass a particular view of ourselves and our world, and any theory of cognition that goes 
against this particular view will be dismissed as erroneous. In van Fraassen's words, "any objectifying 
epistemology must imply that I will be in error if I come to believe that I am something not captured 
by its description of what I am" (2002, 79). For example, say that my theory of cognition depends on 
a certain psychological view of myself. In objectifying epistemology, this already precludes the 
possibility of coming to see myself differently, since any view that goes against this current 
psychological theory can only be regarded as a cognitive short-coming on my part. Furthermore, 
because the objectifying epistemologist cannot see his framework of knowledge as contingent, "any 
conceptual revolution taking us out of [our] current scientific view would be an example of cognitive 
dysfunction, of failure, of error" (van Fraassen, 2002, 79). As such, objectifying epistemology cannot 
accommodate the epistemological issue of scientific and conceptual revolutions.  
This leaves us with a dilemma. We cannot have a "presuppositionless" theory of knowledge removed 
from our current knowledge base (whether science, psychology, religion) nor can we have a theory 
that relies on this knowledge base but at the same time can accommodate the phenomenon of 
scientific and conceptual revolutions. The solution for van Fraassen is simply to reject the project of 
objectifying epistemology in favour of a different epistemology. As van Fraassen sees it, we are 
"engaged in epistemic pursuit, so to speak, pursuit of epistemic goals, of cognitive gain […]. About 
this volitional, intentional activity we hope to discourse illuminatingly without writing a theory about 
it, at least in the narrow sense of 'theory'" (2002, 82). Rather than constructing theories of 
knowledge then, van Fraassen suggests a different approach - a voluntarist approach - in which we 
investigate the "tactics and strategies" of this "volitional, intentional activity" (2002, 82).  
With tactics and strategies, importantly, 'success' is not measured in terms of factual agreement or 
theoretical confirmation but rather in relation to a particular aim or telos: our tactics are successful if 
they help us to reach our aim. Thus success in voluntarist epistemology depends on how we define 
our epistemic aims. Following William James, van Fraassen outlines two epistemic aims: to gain truth 
and to avoid error (2002, 86). Of course, these aims are in conflict with one another. If we want just 
to gain truth we should believe everything, catching the truth among the falsehoods; whereas if we 
want just to avoid error we should believe nothing, eschewing all falsehoods along with truth.3 
Because of this conflict, these goals cannot together serve as the aim of our epistemology. We must 
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define our epistemic aim as the "measure of balance" that we find between these conflicting aims 
(van Fraassen, 2002, 87). About this "measure of balance", van Fraassen writes:  
[…] any measure [...] by which we may balance the two desires and find a point of 
equilibrium, we will have to supply ourselves. Neither logic nor empirical study will take 
away this element of choice or the value judgement involved in that choice. […] The value 
judgement that supplies a measure of balance between our separate desires is up to us; the 
choice is momentous, and it is unavoidable (2002, 88-89).  
Moreover, we can recognise contextual factors that are involved in reconciling this Jamesian tension. 
Whether I balance my epistemic aim more towards the 'gaining truth' side or the 'avoiding error' 
side of the spectrum depends on things like relevance and risk (I want to gain truth that is relevant 
and to avoid errors that might bring particularly unpleasant consequences). In turn, what we count 
as relevant or risky depends to some extent on what we – as individuals and a collective – value. In 
van Fraassen's words: 
We need to relativise, or to recognise sensitivity to context, in these two desires. Part of our 
judgment here, a very important part, derives from our opinion of what others will want 
from us. We are part of an information economy,4 in which certain sorts of information are 
much more valuable than others. [...] Enfin, the values involved here are quite different from 
mere desires for truthful information and freedom from error (2002, 88).  
In this way, values and volition find a "legitimate place" within van Fraassen's voluntarist 
epistemology (2002, 91).  
1.2) Voluntarist epistemology and revolutions: permissive rationality and emotion 
Still, merely acknowledging the presence (and importance) of values and value-based judgements in 
our epistemic lives does not address the issue of radical epistemic change and revolutions . We still 
cannot make sense of the seemingly absurd epistemic choices that come with moving from one 
theory or worldview to another. To be sure, understanding scientific and conceptual revolutions 
poses a challenge beyond the scope of this dissertation; nevertheless it is the epistemic issue that 
van Fraassen selects as a case study in explicating his voluntarist account. In order to give a fuller 
appreciation of his epistemology, then, we shall briefly consider van Fraassen's approach to the issue 
of revolutions.   
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To make sense of revolutions and the radical changes involved, van Fraassen complements his 
voluntarist epistemology with a permissive account of rationality and an existentialist theory of 
emotion. Consider rationality first: for van Fraassen, rationality is "but bridled irrationality" (2002, 
92). A belief is rational so long as it is not irrational, where irrationality is understood as something 
internal ("self-sabotage" as van Fraassen says (2007, 354)) like logical incoherence or inconsistency. 
To believe simultaneously that it is both raining and not raining outside would, for example, be 
inconsistent and therefore irrational. Provided that we stay within the confines of rationality, 
however, we may believe anything. This is permissive in that there is nothing that we, as rational 
agents, must believe. As van Fraassen writes: 
Changes in view are not rational because they are rationally compelled; they are rational 
exactly if they are rationally permitted, if they do not transgress the bounds of reason (2002, 
92).  
It is important to note the role that van Fraassen's permissive rationality plays in his voluntarism as a 
whole. Namely, his permissive account helps us to make sense of the voluntarist possibility of two 
rational inquirers (a cautious one, say, and a risk-taker) who have opposing epistemic practices but 
who nonetheless operate within the same epistemic framework. Assuming that neither falls into 
internal error or incoherence, we can understand both the cautious inquirer and his bold opposite as 
rational - even if their respective values result in different epistemic aims and findings. By contrast, if 
we were to view rationality as something compelling, then both inquirers would be rationally 
obliged to follow the same epistemic path on pain of being irrational. On van Fraassen's permissive 
account, however, as long as we stay within the confines of rationality, there is no set path that we 
'have' to take. Instead, there are many, many paths that we 'may' take and still remain within the 
"bounds of reason".   
When it comes to scientific and conceptual revolutions, furthermore, permissive rationality helps us 
to make rational sense (at least retrospectively) of the changes our beliefs undergo during a 
revolution: the changes from one path to another, so to speak. Provided that the new, post-
revolutionary position is not irrational by its own lights, there is nothing irrational in changing paths. 
Since there are many possibilities within our rational reach, we can still consider ourselves as 
rational epistemic agents despite drastic changes to our belief system. On van Fraassen's account, 
revolutionary change is thus rationally permissible.  
Admittedly, however, this is only part of the issue. What still needs to be addressed is the prior issue 












epistemic option to us. Before the shift to a new worldview, there is a period when our current 
epistemic structures (our current values, beliefs, and theories and also our epistemic framework, the 
patterns of inference and induction that we follow, our current models of decision-theoretic 
reasoning) are weighed down by anomalies and failed predictions. At this point, the new position 
does not yet seem a viable (or even sensical) alternative and as such our current epistemic options 
are exhausted. How does the situation change?  
One possible answer, and the one that van Fraassen gives, is through emotion. We shall look at this 
later and in greater detail, but let us give a brief consideration here. For van Fraassen, it is through 
emotion that "the very parameters" of our epistemic situation change, allowing us to appreciate the 
new position as a live option (2002, 102). Following Sartre's (1939) theory of emotions, van Fraassen 
presents an account of emotion as something transformative. To make sense of this, consider the 
optimist and the pessimist. Both occupy the same world, but as a result of differing emotions and 
attitudes, the one sees metaphorical roses where the other sees only weeds. In a sense, this is a 
form of emotional transformation. Or, to use Sartre's own Aesopian example: trying in vain to reach 
a bunch of grapes, I am prompted by the tension of my situation (I want the grapes but I can't reach 
them) to see the grapes differently. They no longer look tasty, but rather unripe ("too green"). My 
disappointment in being unable to reach the grapes transforms my attitude towards them. I no 
longer want to eat the grapes and hence it ceases to matter that they are unreachable. The tension 
of my situation is resolved (1939, 65-6).5 
Scientific and conceptual revolutions present a similar case. In the moments leading up to a 
revolution, we have run out of epistemic possibilities ("All ways are barred" (Sartre, 1939, 63)). Any 
change that "makes intelligible" the seemingly absurd new theory or worldview must be, as van 
Fraassen notes, "in important part a change in attitude" (2002, 107). And since, given van Fraassen's 
permissive account of rationality, this change is not rationally compelled, it is thus best understood 
as a change brought on by what Sartre describes as emotion. Prior to the relativistic revolution, for 
example, the notion of relative mass is but an absurd joke to the classical physicist. Relativity only 
becomes intelligible (and hence a viable option) to him when emotion changes his attitude towards 
relativistic physics.6 
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 In Sartre's words: "The disagreeable tension becomes, in its turn, a motive for seeing another quality in those 
grapes: their being 'too green', which will  resolve the conflict and put an end to the tension. Only, I cannot 
confer this quality upon the grapes chemically. [...] I confer the required quality upon the grapes magically 
[that is, through emotion]" (1939, 65-6).  
6
 Admittedly, the emotion involved here may not be any of the "familiar emotions" that we encounter in 












Of course, saying that emotion brings about a change in attitude does not explain how or why this 
emotion is brought about or what kind of situations precedes such a change; it is a causal story at 
best (van Fraassen, 2002, 109). But what van Fraassen has shown us (and what is important for our 
purposes) is that his voluntarist epistemology can accommodate talk of emotion, personal  volition, 
and individual choice, and that this is done in a way that partly addresses the issue of scientific and 
conceptual revolutions.  
By now we should have some understanding of van Fraassen's voluntarist position in empiricist 
epistemology and in philosophy as a whole. For van Fraassen, committing to a particular 
philosophical position (metaphysical realism, empiricism, materialism) is more than just a factual 
matter: also involved are various values, attitudes, and non-factual commitments that characterise 
each particular stance. Against this background, van Fraassen seeks to develop his chosen 
philosophical position, the empirical stance. In doing so, he incorporates themes from pragmatism 
(James) and existentialism (Sartre) to tell a story of who we are, as individuals and as a community, 
engaged in the pursuit of knowledge. This story is distinct from the objectifying tradition in 
epistemology since voluntarist epistemology defines epistemic success in terms of aims - aims which 
reflect our epistemic values, attitudes, commitments, emotions, individual and collective needs, and 
so forth - rather than factual or theoretical correspondence. With van Fraassen's permissive 
rationality there are many equally rational epistemic paths to choose. The presence of individual 
volition in his epistemology thus gives us the freedom to express ourselves through our epistemic 
and philosophical choices.  
Two issues arise at this point. The first concerns the very possibility of values and choice in 
philosophy (issues with voluntarism itself) and the second concerns the consequences of 
accommodating values and choice in philosophy (issues with subjectivism and relativism). We shall 
address briefly the voluntarist issue before moving on to what will be the main focus of our 
discussion: the spectres of subjectivism and relativism in van Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology. 
1.3) General issues with voluntarism in philosophy (epistemology) 
Bernard Williams raises the issue of belief voluntarism in his (1973) 'Deciding at Will'. Since beliefs 
aim at things like truth or accuracy, Williams points out, we cannot simply or coherently believe 
whatever we choose. Rather, we believe something - say, we believe that p - because we have an 
epistemic reason of some kind that is connected to the truth of p (the likelihood of p being true). 
                                                                                                                                                        
that plays a transformative role akin to that which emotion plays in Sartre's theory (van Fraassen, 2002, 107). 
We might note, however, that some (McMulli n (2007)) criticise van Fraassen's emotional characterisation of 












That is, I believe that it will rain tomorrow because the barometer shows a particular reading 
(something epistemic or evidential) and not because I like the sound of rain (something non-
epistemic). On van Fraassen's voluntarist account, however, part of why we believe something is 
because of our particular values and attitudes and this is a non-epistemic matter.  
As a first response, van Fraassen draws a distinction between belief and acceptance familiar from his 
philosophy of science. He writes: 
There are many reasons to accept a good theory if only because a good theory has many 
uses and is valuable in many ways. [...] Many of these legitimate reasons for acceptance fall 
outside the reasons for belief, in that they do not make it more likely that the theory as a 
whole is 'tracking the truth'. (van Fraassen, 2002, 89-90).  
Here it seems that van Fraassen, at least in the case of science, isn't talking about out-and-out belief 
so much as acceptance, in which case the issue of Williams' belief voluntarism does not arise. 
However, whether this is a good response depends in large part upon van Fraassen’s philosophy of 
science, his so-called constructive empiricism and the cogency thereof. 
Whatever the merits of that response, there is a more straightforward answer to this objection. That 
is, van Fraassen's voluntarism is at the level of stances rather than beliefs and, while it is true that 
we might adopt or accept a particular epistemic or philosophical stance partly for non-epistemic 
reasons (reasons involving our commitments, attitude, values, and so forth), our chosen stance will 
nonetheless provide us with epistemic standards for forming and maintaining our beliefs. Thus again, 
the issue of Williams' belief-voluntarism does not arise, at least not directly. 
However, this may only delay rather than respond to Williams' objection. Empiricism is still 
concerned with matters of knowledge and inquiry. In this way, it is an epistemic stance, yet it seems 
that it is adopted for non-epistemic reasons (because it best expresses our values and attitudes). For 
Baumann (2011), while we might admit to non-epistemic or pragmatic motivations behind our 
stance choice, epistemic reasons are also necessary. This is because epistemic stances "have an 
essential relation to epistemic projects and activities and therefore also to epistemic reasons" (2011, 
33). As Baumann understands van Fraassen's voluntarist position, however, we might adopt a stance 
"for non-epistemic reasons, perhaps even for no reasons whatsoever" (2011, 28-9). This is 












[...] it is very hard if not impossible to see how a person could coherently think of her project 
and her stance as epistemic [...] while at the same time acknowledging that she has no 
epistemic reasons in favour of her stance (2011, 31).  
Understood in this way, stance voluntarism seems to be "deeply irrational" in that we can adopt a 
stance for non-epistemic reasons but with an epistemic goal or project in mind (Baumann, 2011, 30).  
As van Fraassen acknowledges, it is of course irrational ("pragmatically inconsistent") to believe or 
endorse something with "no good or adequate reason for it" (2011, 162-3). That said, any 
justification, good or bad, that we give for our beliefs risks underdetermination by the evidence 
available. There is a gap between evidence and belief such that, as van Fraassen writes, "the total 
evidence we have does not force our current opinion or belief upon us" (2011, 163). How does this 
respond to Baumann's worry? Well, it shows us that van Fraassen agrees with Baumann overall: that 
it is irrational to believe something for no good or inclining reason, where  a good reason is one that 
speaks (at least in part) to the likelihood of our belief being true. 
What does this leave van Fraassen's voluntarism? Well, as the problem of underdetermination 
shows us, even our best reasons will include non-epistemic things (values, attitudes) and, as such, 
cannot be not rationally compelling. This is van Fraassen's permissive rationality: we may believe 
that p or we may not, and different people, with different values and commitments, may believe or 
may not believe that p for reasons different from our own. As this suggests, what counts as a good 
reason is a contextual matter. Van Fraassen's stance voluntarism is simply an acknowledgement of 
this. As he explains with reference to his chosen stance of empiricism:  
If I acknowledge that what I can thus offer you will not be rationally compelling for you - not 
rationally compel you to become an empiricist, though it will make empiricism look more 
attractive to you than it may have seemed theretofore - without impugning your rationality 
or my own, then - as I understand the term - I am a voluntarist with respect to this empirical 
stance (2011, 163-4).  
For Baumann, though, a good reason seems to be one that would move any rational believer in any 
context. This is what van Fraassen would call a Prussian view of rationality: rationality as something 
that dictates a single path that we as rational beings must follow. This view of rationality, however, 
belongs in the tradition of objectifying epistemology. By contrast, van Fraassen's permissive 
rationality allows us many paths, each equally rational. In this way, voluntarism allows people to 












Van Fraassen's voluntarism is one level up from simply 'believing at will'; it is believing for reasons 
that are rational but that are not necessarily shared by nor compelling of all rational believers.  
In his response to Williams and Baumann, van Fraassen thus defends his voluntarism as a coherent 
philosophical position. We shall now consider the implications of voluntarism in philosophy; namely, 
the issue of subjectivism and relativism.  
1.4) Subjectivism issues and van Fraassen 
As we have seen, van Fraassen's voluntarist account is a move away from objectivity (or rather, a 
certain common understanding thereof). On his account, things like philosophical positions, scientific 
theories, and claims to knowledge reflect non-factual (non-objective) things like values, attitudes, 
and commitments. This is a concern if we want to defend or critique these things, since on van 
Fraassen's account of reason-giving, the reasons that we have for our beliefs (or for our stance or 
theory choice) extend beyond merely factual claims to reflect our values and commitments. How 
then can we discuss our reasons with others? Van Fraassen addresses this in The Empirical Stance: 
Since the differing stances also involve value judgments and attitudes towards life, love, and 
laughter, their basis may be thought to be purely subjective, merely subjective,  and not 
susceptible to rational debate. But if that is indeed what is behind it [the concern] then I 
cannot really take it seriously. [...] On the one hand, we know very well how to defeat the 
simplistic philosophies that make values just a matter of subjective preference, dismissably 
relative. On the other, we too are members of a highly politicized open society in which 
ethical and ideological differences are precisely what are most up for debate. We need not 
look far to see that rational discourse is possible on matters that touch our values, attitudes, 
and commitments. So I'd just like to say: look around you, take part, welcome to the real 
world! (2002, 63) 
As this extract indicates, for van Fraassen the presence of values need not stifle the possibility for 
rational and meaningful discussion. Indeed, as we saw in van Fraassen’s response to Baumann, 
reasons are contextual – value-based or otherwise – and as such dialogue can proceed without 
recourse to the sort of reasons imagined in objectifying epistemology. Still it is unclear whether such 
value-based discourse is truly possible in the "real world" and if it is, whether it is appropriate or 
desirable when it comes to philosophy, science and scientific theories, or claims to knowledge.  
As van Fraassen writes, "rational discourse is possible on matters that touch our values, attitudes, 












possible does not mean that it is probable or even feasible in the real world. This is especially clear if 
we consider societies that are not as "highly politicized and open" as our own; societies in which, 
say, discussion is not valued and things like equality and tolerance are not virtues. Within these 
societies, it seems more likely that value-based disagreement will be met with dismissal, stone-
walling, or worse, rather than conversation and debate. A similar outcome seems likely should we, 
as members of a "politicized and open" society, attempt to engage with such a society. This is partly 
because, as Dien Ho writes, value conflicts "are typically thought of as being potentially 
unresolvable" (2007, 327). He continues: 
 […] resolutions of value disagreements are often accomplished by pointing out logical 
inconsistencies within one's opponent's web of value commitments. Indeed, we usually 
come to the resolution only because we share certain fundamental value commitments (e.g. 
procedural justice, aversion to pain, the prima facie value of human life, etc.). If, as it is 
logically possible, one comes across an individual whose web of value commitments is 
internally coherent, it does not appear possible that we can change his view via rational 
discourse (2007, 328).  
As Ho seems to be saying, we usually solve value-based disputes through some kind of reductio 
move - showing our opponent that their view is logically inconsistent or leads to consequences that 
both of us find undesirable. This kind of argument, however, depends on a background of shared 
value commitments. Without such a background, resolution seems unlikely. As such, van Fraassen’s 
confidence in the possibility of rational, value-based discourse concerning our values, attitudes, and 
commitments needs further justification.  
This aside, even if such discourse were possible, it is not clear that it would be appropriate for the 
disciplines of philosophy or science or for matters relating to knowledge. As Ho sees it, when it 
comes to real-world value disagreements, "[…] we often employ means to change one another’s 
minds that are philosophically speaking impermissible. We can bribe, confuse, seduce, threaten, and 
beg our opponents into changing their value commitments" (2007, 330). And in as much as van 
Fraassen is advocating a portrayal of philosophy (philosophy as stance) that makes philosophical 
discussion value-based rather than fact-based, then for Ho at least, he seems to be suggesting that 
bribery, seduction, threats, and confusion tactics find a place in the discipline of philosophy. This is a 
difficult suggestion to accept.  
Anja Jauernig expresses a similar sentiment. She writes: "[…] standing proudly by one's own values, 












critique" (2007, 307). This is because for Jauernig, while some values (such as the value of truth over 
falsehood, or the value of discussion itself) are inevitably present in philosophical debates, 
philosophical critique is possible "only with regard to matters concerning which mistakes are 
possible" and as she understands van Fraassen's value-talk, "there are no possible mistakes with 
regard to values" (2007, 307).7 She concludes: 
[…] if [van Fraassen] indeed wants to say that expressing disdain for one 's philosophical 
opponents is appropriate in a philosophical debate, and should be counted as a 
philosophical critique, we might want to put a question mark behind the relevance and 
general appeal of his project (2007, 308).  
For Jauernig, then, van Fraassen’s conception of philosophy is simply undesirable. We can imagine 
similar concerns about the presence of values in scientific and epistemic claims. If I openly reject a 
scientific theory because it does not express my values, or if I defend an epistemic claim on the basis 
of its pragmatic merit alone, it is unlikely that others - scientists, fellow inquirers - will take me 
seriously in this.  
The points raised by Ho and Jauernig rely on a particular distinction and a particular understanding 
of values, both of which van Fraassen dismisses. That is, Jauernig and Ho seem to assume a fact-
value distinction that makes fact-based discussion resolvable and value-based discussion 
unresolvable whereas for van Fraassen, "reason to despair in one case would be reason to despair in 
the other […]. A debilitating relativism and a shrill shouting dogmatism are the two absurd extremes 
in either case" (2007, 375). That is, while it is true (as Ho fears) that value-based disputes might be 
unresolvable, there is also the risk that factual disputes be unresolvable ("shrill shouting 
dogmatism"). Indeed, without a shared background of beliefs, it is unclear how a factual dispute 
would proceed. If my opponent does not share my beliefs that Fido is a dog, say, and that dogs are 
mammals, then it seems unlikely that I shall be able to convince him (without bribery, seduction) 
that Fido cannot breathe under water. As van Fraassen writes:  
We do have factual opinion and values already, we mariners at sea, confronting difficulties 
to be resolved now. The parallel in this respect is complete. If we have factual disagreement, 
we can settle that just by looking, but only provided our background beliefs are such that 
what we see settles it. If we have value disagreement, we can settle that too by just looking, 
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 Of course, Jauernig's criticism of van Fraassen - as she herself admits - might be a value judgement about 
"what is worthwhile in a philosophical dialogue" (2007, 307). None theless, hers is a sentiment l ikely to be 












mutatis mutandis; namely, provided our background values are such that what we see 
settles it (2007, 377).  
More than this, Jauernig's worry especially relies on a non-cognitive understanding of values that 
van Fraassen himself rejects. On a non-cognitive understanding of values, values are classed as 
subjective things, feelings, sentiments, expressions of "personal preference" (van Fraassen, 2007, 
375). For van Fraassen, however, "we can quite consistently express personal preference at odds 
with what we admit to be real values, or make negative value judgements about our own 
preferences, even while expressing a preference to maintain those very preferences" (2007, 376). 
Values, then, cannot be identified with expressions of personal preference. We can express the 
personal sentiment that, say, "charity is a bore" while still recognising charity as something valuable. 
That charity is good for society is a value judgement; that we might find it boring is a personal 
matter. There is no inconsistency here, as far as van Fraassen is concerned. The possible point of 
confusion on this matter is most likely that both values and personal  sentiment are things that are 
"expressed" or attributed to individuals, unlike facts that have to be stated (as van Fraassen writes, 
"[…] there is no literal sense of 'express a fact'" (2007, 376)). Nonetheless, "this similarity provides 
no good argument for equating values, opinions, intentions, aims, and preferences" (van Fraassen, 
2007, 376). The expression of values in philosophical or other dialogue, then, need not amount to an 
expression of disdain or personal dislike.  
Still, what "looms large" for both Ho and Jauernig is the possibility that van Fraassen’s position will 
undermine meaningful philosophical (or scientific or epistemic) debate (van Fraassen, 2007, 378). 
How can we debate and discuss with those from a different background? How can we turn them to 
our point of view? Van Fraassen is optimistic in his response: 
Well, what about showing them possibilities in the human condition they had not already 
apprehended? What about opening new vistas for them, about what the world is or could be 
like? Why this scepticism about human communication that would make it inconceivable 
that we can show for example metaphysicians how attractive empiricism is, just as we can 
show people who grew up quite differently just how attractive a life of charity and tolerance 
toward all can be? (2007, 378)  
For van Fraassen, we do not have recourse to the kind of transcendent and objective reasons 
dreamed about in traditional epistemology (and, if we think otherwise, we are victims of false 
consciousness). What we do have, rather, is the freedom to choose who we are and who we want to 












nor truth, can take the responsibility for this choice from us. Ho is sympathetic on this point. He 
writes: 
Philosophy cannot tell us what to do. We, as a community of philosophers, must decide what 
to do. It is, I think, in this sense that van Fraassen is correct when he says "Welcome to the 
real world." In the real world, we do make decisions about a particular practice not guided 
by the rules of the practice but by certain extra-practice considerations (humanism, love, 
beauty, simplicity, pragmatic reasons, and so on) (2007, 332).  
Even so, sympathy is not agreement and as it stands, it seems unlikely that philosophers (or 
scientists or inquirers) will readily accept van Fraassen's voluntarist position. Nonetheless we should 
note Ho's mention of community here. That is, it is perhaps through a sense of community and 
community-based values that we might best appreciate van Fraassen's position. This is my 
contention, at the very least. In the next chapter, we shall consider how an intersubjective 
understanding of values might save van Fraassen's philosophy from some of the problems raised 
above. 
1.5) Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I first presented van Fraassen's position in The Empirical Stance comprising his 
voluntarism and voluntarist epistemology, his permissive rationality, and his stance philosophy. For 
the most part, van Fraassen draws up his position in opposition to what he calls "objectifying 
epistemology". To show the dissimilarity between van Fraassen's voluntarism and the tradition of 
objectifying epistemology and to clarify van Fraassen's position, I looked at the epistemic issue 
posed by scientific and conceptual revolutions and the points raised by Williams and Baumann 
against voluntarism in philosophy and epistemology.  
I then turned to the focus of my dissertation: the issue of subjectivism and relativism and the 
possibility van Fraassen's position holds for meaningful discussion. For some (Ho, Jauernig), the 
presence of values in van Fraassen's position makes it difficult to see how public and shared 
discourse might take place within his voluntarist epistemology. For van Fraassen, however, in an 
"open" and "highly politicized" society such as our own, we can discuss and debate our values, 
commitments, and attitudes. This is something we do every day, especially when it comes to areas 
like ethics or politics. Nonetheless, as Ho and Jauernig contest, this does not mean that such value-












In response, van Fraassen points to a similarity between fact- and value-based discussion: in both 
cases, a shared background (of beliefs and values, respectively) is needed. This gives us the means to 
discuss and debate these matters meaningfully with others. As I suggest, we can understand this 
shared background in the context of community. In what follows, we shall explore further the role of 














2.) Community, communities 
In this chapter, in response to fears of subjectivism and relativism, I identify an underlying but 
underdeveloped appeal to the notion of community in van Fraassen's discussion of values in The 
Empirical Stance. I then seek to develop this into an intersubjective understanding of the values that, 
for van Fraassen, underlie our philosophical and epistemic decisions.  In doing so, I turn to the 
semantic community of Robert B. Brandom and, for the relativist issue, to Donald Davidson's 
principle of charity. 
2.1) Community in van Fraassen 
For van Fraassen, we are an "historical community of minds" (2004, 183). We are historical beings, 
and our situation reflects this. As philosophers, scientists, inquirers, and individuals, we "rely and 
must rely on our pre-understanding, our own language, and our prior opinion as they are now and 
go on from there" (2002, 139). This suggests some kind of shared, pre-existing background of values 
and opinion, a suggestion that, as we saw in the previous chapter, van Fraassen draws on in his 
response to Ho about the possibility of rational value-based discourse ("If we have a value 
disagreement, we can settle that [...] provided our background values are such that what we see 
settles it" (2007, 377)). Here, the reference to "background values" further suggests that the values 
behind our stance and theory choices and our individual epistemic decisions are not wholly 
subjective but are in part reflective of our collective historical condition. 
With our epistemic decisions in particular, van Fraassen is explicit in his mention of community. His 
Jamesian voluntarism, recall, requires a choice between conflicting epistemic aims (to gain truth and 
to avoid error). Deciding between these aims is a subjective matter, since whether we are brave or 
cautious in our epistemic pursuits is something personal. That is, how we as individuals reconcile our 
conflicting epistemic aims is a choice that is ours alone. Nonetheless, this individual choice is made 
against the background of some sort of epistemic community. Recall van Fraassen's words: 
We need to relativize, or to recognise sensitivity to context, in these two desires. Part of our 
judgment here [in choosing between the two aims], a very important part, derives from our 
opinion of what others will want from us. We are part of an information economy, in which 
certain sorts of information are much more valuable than others. This is […] a matter of 












Here we can see that our choice ("part of our judgment here") is connected to ("sensitivity to 
context") the collective enterprise of knowledge, the "information economy". 
This talk of us as a collective - a "historical community of minds", part of an "information economy" - 
suggests a notion of community in van Fraassen's writings. Importantly, if we take our values and 
commitments as formed against the background of some kind of shared community, then a more 
developed account of this community could help us to make sense of our philosophical and 
epistemic choices, and the values behind these choices, as more than "purely subjective, merely 
subjective" (the subjectivist issue). This in turn could give us a more appealing understanding of van 
Fraassen's position and the possibility it holds for rational discussion of our philosophical and 
epistemic choices, at least within the context of our own community (philosophical or greater). 
Of course, we shall need more than this if we are to address the issue of dialogue between 
communities (the relativist issue). We touched on this at the close of the previous chapter, namely, 
the issue of "confrontation with others who do not share relevant values" (van Fraassen, 2007, 378). 
If a shared background of beliefs, opinion, and values is what makes discussion possible, then 
discussion without such a background seems prima facie impossible. Here, recall, van Fraassen turns 
to "the human condition": if we are trying to change the mind of someone from a community or 
background that is different from our own, we should show them "possibilities in the human 
condition they had not already apprehended" (2007, 378). Whether or not we accept van Fraassen’s 
point here, what is important is that we acknowledge the issue of community relativism when 
developing his notion of community.  
When it comes to collective values and shared backgrounds, philosophers Robert Brandom and 
Donald Davidson each give an account that is neither subjective nor objective but rather 
intersubjective. This is promising for our purposes. Remember, what we seek is (a.) a more 
developed account of the shared background values and opinions, such that we can better 
understand our value-based choices (in philosophy, in knowledge-related matters, in science, and in 
general); and (b.) some sort of refuge from the worry of community relativism that arises when we 
consider other communities. Brandom's (2009) talk of semantic "norms" (standards or rules) and 
reciprocal recognition thereof is particularly fitting in relation to (a.), while Davidson's principle of 
charity and process of radical interpretation gives a useful approach to (b.). 
In what follows, we shall first consider Brandom's reciprocal community, and how his intersubjective 
account of norms and rules might help us to make sense of van Fraassen's community values, before 












2.2) Brandom's reciprocally recognised community 
In his Reason in Philosophy (2009) Brandom gives an evaluative8 account of rationality. That is, as a 
rational being, I ought to think and act rationally (or at least, have reasons for not doing so). 
Similarly, if you recognise me as a rational being, you can hold me responsible to certain (rational) 
obligations and as such, can judge me to be "more or less rational" in my beliefs, commitments, 
actions, and choices (2009, 2).9 This kind of social evaluation or recognition of rationality - your 
recognition and evaluation of me as a rational being and vice versa - forms a "certain kind of 
community" between us: 
Taking something to be subject to appraisals of its reasons, holding it rationally responsible, 
is treating it as a someone: as one of us (rational beings). This [evaluative] attitude toward 
others is recognition [...]. Adopting that attitude is acknowledging a certain kind of 
community with the one recognised (2009, 3).10 
It is this kind of reciprocally recognised community that we shall consider as a possible development 
of van Fraassen's notion of community. This necessitates an appreciation of Brandom's project in its 
own terms.  
2.2.1) Rational responsibility: all in the attitude 
In as much as it can be summarised, Brandom's task is to provide a description of us as "social, 
normative, rational, free, self-consciously historical beings" (2009, 17). In doing so, he revisits the 
German Idealist tradition of Kant and Hegel, in whose respective works he reads an evaluative 
account of rationality.11 Brandom's is a rich and complex project, the intricacy of which falls beyond 
our current scope. For our purposes, we shall limit our attention to Brandom's reading of Hegel and 
his Hegelian model of reciprocal recognition. 
To make sense of Brandom's reciprocal recognition, we must first understand what Brandom means 
by "normative status" and how this is attitude-dependent. Simply, I have normative (or evaluative) 
status according to Brandom when I am responsible or committed to some norm or standard. As a 
speaking being, say, I have normative status because I am committed to certain semantic norms. 
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 Brandom refers to his as a "normative" account; here, however, the term "evaluative" is clearer.   
9
 Of course, the conditional here is open to the relativist worry (how do we recognise as rational those beings 
from other communities).  
10
 Unless otherwise stated, the emphasis is his.   
11
 It should be noted that some scholars find fault with Brandom's interpretation of Kant and Hegel. These 
debates need not concern us. It is enough for us that Brandom is espousing a n account of a reciprocally 












Likewise, scientists are committed to certain standards of explanation, and have normative status in 
this regard. Importantly, whether or not I commit to a certain norm depends on whether or not I 
recognise this norm. Consider a norm to keep off the grass. In order to commit to this norm, I must 
have an awareness (some kind of conception) of the norm or standard to which I am committing. If I 
do not recognise this norm - say, if I cannot read the "Keep off the Grass" sign - then I cannot 
commit to it and it has no effect on me. In other words, for a norm to have "binding force" on its 
subjects requires the awareness and subsequent commitment of these subjects (Brandom, 2009, 
54). Brandom contrasts this to physical regularities and laws of nature, things which "must happen" 
(2009, 54). Take the law of gravity, for example. This law is effective with or without the awareness 
or compliance of its subjects, acting upon humans, dogs, tables, and oranges regardless.   
Importantly, given that normative statuses require the recognition of their subjects, for Brandom 
they are attitude-dependent. This is because recognising a particular norm is a matter of adopting a 
particular attitude towards it. Without this recognitive attitude, we cannot commit to the norm. In 
this way, norms gain their purport from the attitudes of their subjects (Brandom, 2009, 61). 
Brandom traces this notion of attitude-dependence to the Enlightenment: 
This movement of thought is animated by a revolutionary new conception of the relations 
between normative statuses and the attitudes of the human beings who are the subjects of 
such statuses, the ones who commit themselves, undertake responsibilities, and exercise 
authority, and who acknowledge and attribute (practically take themselves and others to 
exhibit) those statuses. This is the idea that normative statuses are attitude-dependent. The 
idea that authority, responsibility, and commitment were not features of the non- or pre-
human world (2009, 61).  
Thus, our normative commitments (statuses) are human constructs; they are not part of the  natural 
framework of the world nor are they divinely imposed:  
They [normative statuses] did not exist until human beings started taking or treating each 
other as authoritative, responsible, committed, and so on - that is, until they started 
adopting normative attitudes toward one another. Those attitudes, and the social practices 
that make adopting them possible, institute the normative statuses [...] (Brandom, 2009, 61). 
Brandom develops the attitude-dependence of our normative statuses into a model of autonomy. 
Since it is my attitude that in part institutes my normative status, there is a sense in which only I 












[...] we, as subjects, are genuinely normatively constrained only by rules we constrain 
ourselves by, those that we adopt and acknowledge as binding on us. [...] In this sense, only 
we can bind ourselves, in the sense that we are only normatively bound by the results of 
exercises of our freedom [...] (2009, 62).  
In recognising and committing to a particular norm, then, I am exercising my freedom, my 
autonomy. This autonomy consists in "our authority to make ourselves rationally responsible by 
taking ourselves to be responsible" (Brandom, 2009, 63). We institute our normative status ("make 
ourselves rationally responsible") through the authoritative act of adopting a particular attitude and 
recognising ourselves as such ("taking ourselves to be responsible"). On Brandom's model of 
autonomy, then, "authority and responsibility are symmetric and reciprocal, [...] features of the 
normative subject who is at once authoritative and responsible" (2009, 63). It is this reciprocity 
between authority and responsibility that, as we shall see, Brandom extends to the social realm in 
his Hegelian model of reciprocal recognition.  
2.2.2) Reciprocal recognition: authority and responsibility in the social realm 
By now we should have some appreciation of Brandom's account of us as evaluative (normative) 
rational beings. We have seen how authority and responsibility are reciprocal across the individual 
subject, who is both authoritative over his normative status and responsible to the norms and 
commitments this status entails. Still it is not entirely clear how these norms can exert a genuine 
force over their subjects, since at the end of the day it is we - the rational subjects - who have 
authority over which norms we recognise and to which norms we commit ourselves. The issue, as 
Brandom puts it, is that "one must bind oneself, but one must also bind oneself" (2009, 64).  
To make sense of norms as genuinely binding, Brandom extends the reciprocity of authority and 
responsibility to the social realm. He does this through his model of Hegelian reciprocal recognition: 
[...] authority and responsibility are ultimately social phenomena. They are the products of 
the attitudes, on the one hand, of those who undertake responsibility and exercise authority 
[as it was for the individual case], and on the other, of those who hold others responsible 
and acknowledge their authority (2009, 68).  
On this model, authority and responsibility are reciprocal across not one but two or more beings 
(Brandom, 2009, 66-7). My commitment to a particular norm, my normative status, depends not 
only on my attitude (in that I recognise and commit to this norm) but yours as well: "[s]omeone 












others acknowledge that authority" (Brandom, 2009, 70). In order to institute my normative status, 
then, you must recognise me as committed to the relevant norm. Here, our respective attitudes are 
individually necessary but only jointly sufficient in establishing my commitment and responsibility to 
this norm (Brandom, 2009, 70).  
Importantly, however, my individual autonomy is preserved since my normative status is still in part 
a matter of my individual authority and attitude. My autonomy is further respected in that it is up to 
me to whom I appeal for recognition of my normative status. That is, it is up to me - it is an exercise 
of my authority - whom I recognise as authoritative over my normative status. In Brandom's words: 
"[n]o one has authority over me except that which I grant by my recognitive attitudes" (2009, 71). 
For your recognition of my normative commitment to be effective, I must in turn recognise your 
recognition as authoritative. 
To illustrate this process, Brandom uses the "mundane example" of chess players (2009, 70-1). Say I 
am an aspiring chess player. I cannot achieve the status of "good chess player" on my own, since this 
is not just a matter of my own attitude towards my chess-playing ability but also the attitudes of 
other chess players whom I recognise as "good". Whether or not I am a good chess player thus 
depends on whether or not my chess-playing standard is to the satisfaction of those whom I, in turn, 
identify as good players. For Brandom, "I must be recognised as such by those I recognise as such" 
(2009, 71). In this way, reciprocal recognition synthesizes a kind of community through the 
reciprocal attitudes of its individual members: 
My recognitive attitudes can define a virtual community, but only the reciprocal recognition 
by those I recognise can make me actually a member of it, accord me the status for which I 
have implicitly petitioned by recognising them (2009, 71).  
Moreover: 
[...] the attitudes of myself and my fellows in the recognitive community, of those I recognise 
and who recognise me, are sufficient to institute normative statuses that are not subjective 
in the same way in which the normative attitudes that institute them are (2009, 71).  
Here, community involvement makes my normative status an intersubjective affair, rather than a 
subjective one. My status as a good chess player is not subjective; it is the result of mutual 













2.2.3) Brandom in reflection 
As we have seen, Brandom weaves together an historical account of rationality, autonomy, 
authority, responsibility, and community to arrive at an intersubjective understanding of our 
semantic norms and commitments.  
Brandom's account of rationality is evaluative in that we can be "more or less rational": we can 
honour our rational commitments and responsibilities or we can shirk them. Moreover, since the 
rational responsibilities we undertake are partly a result of our individual attitudes, and since we 
alone have authority over our attitude, we have autonomy over which rational norms we commit to 
and which responsibilities we undertake. For these norms to be truly binding, Brandom extends this 
symmetrical model of responsibility and authority to the social sphere such that, for us as individuals 
to undertake rational responsibilities (and so gain normative status) we must be recognised as 
responsible by those whom we in turn recognise as authoritative on such matters. In this way, 
Brandom's model of reciprocal recognition synthesizes a community of rational, normative, 
committed beings and, in the process, gives intersubjective force to our norms, standards, and 
commitments, thus avoiding pure subjectivity.  
2.3) Reciprocal recognition and van Fraassen's sense of community 
How might Brandom's account of community help our endeavours? That is, how might his model of 
reciprocal recognition help us to understand further our "shared background", our "historical 
community of minds", such that we can make sense of value-based choices and discussion in van 
Fraassen's The Empirical Stance? Importantly for van Fraassen, individual choice is respected on 
Brandom's model, in that I have autonomy over which norms I recognise and to which norms  I 
commit. Importantly for our subjectivist concerns, these individual choices are not "purely 
subjective, merely subjective" but must be recognised by others. 
Reciprocal recognition gives us a way to think about how our "historical community of minds" comes 
about, and how our values and choices within this community might be socially recognised and thus, 
perhaps, open for public discussion. Still, there are notable differences between the respective 
projects of Brandom and van Fraassen. While Brandom gives us an intersubjective understanding of 
our norms and commitments, his primary focus is semantic norms whereas van Fraassen is 
interested in epistemic values and philosophical commitments. There is also a possible discrepancy 
between Brandom's talk of "norms" and van Fraassen's "values". Working through these differences 












as to address subjectivist concerns with both van Fraassen's stance philosophy and his voluntarist 
epistemology. We shall consider first the norms-values distinction.   
2.3.1) Norms versus values 
For Brandom, reciprocal recognition involves norms and rules rather than values. Nevertheless, as 
we shall see, a consideration of his chess-playing example in relation to van Fraassen's talk of values 
helps us to make sense of our choices, and the values behind them, as intersubjective rather than 
wholly subjective. 
Certainly, it is not immediately apparent that Brandom's account of norms and standards is 
comparable to the values, attitudes, and commitments of van Fraassen's stance philosophy and 
voluntarist epistemology. Committing to a particular semantic standard seems quite a different 
matter to committing to a particular good or value (the value of charity, say, or of a certain type of 
explanation). Likewise playing by the rules of chess seems a different matter to stance choice in van 
Fraassen's philosophy: that is, playing chess involves obeying a finite number of rules and legal 
expressions whereas, for van Fraassen, choosing a philosophical stance is something permissive, 
more an act of personal expression than an exercise in rule-following.  
On reflection, however, it seems that Brandom's account is indeed rich enough to accommodate 
both chess-like rules and van Fraassen's more permissive values and attitudes. This is because both 
kinds of commitments can be grounded in the process of reciprocal recognition. Brandom himself 
concludes his chess-playing example with a suggested extension to philosophy: "I must be 
recognised as such by those I recognise as such. (The same is true of being a good philosopher)" 
(2009, 71). If we can indeed broaden Brandom's account of community to include things like van 
Fraassen's values, attitudes, and standards, then we can use Brandom to further develop the sense 
of community in van Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology and his stance philosophy.  
To illustrate this, let us consider a community of jazz musicians. Jazz is a style of music with certain 
recognisable characteristics such as polyrhythm and improvisation. Importantly, however, this is a 
fluid definition: it is not the case that every piece of music that is polyrhythmic or improvised is jazz 
nor is it the case that every piece of jazz displays these characteristics. (By contrast, it is the case that 
every game of chess is played by certain rules, on a certain playing-board and with a certain number 
of pieces, each with certain moves. Conversely, any deviation from these rules would mean that the 












Now let's say that I want to be a part of this community of jazz musicians. On Brandom's account, 
recall, this is not a purely subjective matter since I cannot achieve the recognised status of jazz 
musician (that is, become a member of a community of jazz musicians) by my attitude alone (2009, 
71). I must also seek recognition from whichever group I recognise as authoritative on the subject; 
that is, from the community of jazz musicians that I want to join. If  this community recognises that I 
measure up to its standards - that I play in the required way and at the required level - and hence 
recognises me as one of its own, then I gain the status of jazz musician. The same model of 
reciprocal recognition of authority and responsibility applies here: I keep my autonomy in that I have 
authority over which group I recognise as authoritative over my status as a jazz musician, just as the 
group of jazz musicians exercises authority over whether or not they recognise me as such. Similarly 
for responsibility: I recognise, and am responsible for playing to, the standards of this jazz 
community, just as the community itself recognises me as responsible to its standards. Through such 
reciprocal recognition, a community of jazz musicians is formed. This example suggests that 
Brandom's model is rich enough to ground both jazz and chess-playing standards in the synthesized 
communities of jazz musicians and chess players respectively.  
Brandom's model of reciprocal recognition can thus be extended to accommodate norms and 
standards other than those of the semantic or chess-playing variety. As such, his account might help 
us to make sense of the broader values, attitudes, and commitments that institute van Fraassen's 
"historical community of minds". Consider: as an historical community of minds, we have a certain 
"body of opinion", which includes certain values and attitudes (van Fraassen, 2004, 183). We might 
value knowledge over ignorance, say, or democracy over fascism. We might hold a particular 
attitude towards the scientific method, or towards human rights and equality. It is perhaps through 
the reciprocal recognition of these richer values and attitudes that our historical community is 
synthesized, thus giving us a collective of beings with common values, attitudes, commitments, 
opinions, beliefs, standards, and so on. Also, the intersubjective nature of these values and attitudes 
helps us to make sense of value-based discourse within this community, as our shared history and 
values provide the requisite shared background for meaningful discussion.   
Within this "historical community of minds", similarly, reciprocal recognition of our richer and more 
selective norms and values might synthesize further communities. Over and above being members 
of some general and historical community, that is, we might be members of certain select 
communities: we could be scientists, for example, or athletes or philosophers. And within these 












are molecular biologists, theoretical physicists, and organic chemists. Athletes can be triathlon 
runners or high-jumpers; philosophers can be epistemologists, empiricists, or applied ethicists. 
Here, reciprocal recognition helps us to make sense of the interplay between stance choice and the 
select communities of philosophers and scientists. Choosing a particular philosophical stance, that is, 
involves recognising and committing to certain values and attitudes. Say I choose the empirical 
stance. This involves (among other things) recognising and committing to the value of empirical 
evidence and adopting a particular attitude of admiration concerning the scientific method.  In this 
case, reciprocal recognition of the values and attitudes involved in my stance choice not only 
institutes my status as an empiricist but also serves to establish a community of empiricists. And 
since these empiricist values are socially recognised, we can make  better sense of value-based 
dialogue within the empirical stance and, to an extent, within philosophy itself. On this model, we 
can understand stance choice and the values involved as not merely subjective things, but also as a 
matter of community.   
2.3.2) Semantic versus epistemic 
This intersubjective appreciation of our values and stance choice is useful, but how exactly might we 
discuss these things with fellow members of our community? Here, reflection on the semantic-
epistemic distinction offers some insight. 
Although Brandom is predominantly interested in semantics, his larger project (as we shall see) 
concerns reasoning itself. This highlights a similarity between the respective accounts of Brandom 
and van Fraassen and helps us to make sense of value-based discussion within a community context. 
In Reason in Philosophy, Brandom acknowledges the interdependence of meaning (semantics) and 
belief: "The semantic and epistemic dimensions of thought and language use are not only 
understood as inextricably intertwined, their common structure is the inferential articulation 
characteristic of the space of reasons" (2009, 5). When it comes to the practice of giving and asking 
for reasons, then, what matters more to Brandom than any semantic or epistemic distinction is  the 
inferential structure of our reasons. For Brandom, reasons are understood in terms of inference, 
which itself is understood in the context of propositional content such that "what is propositionally 
contentful is what can stand in inferential relations" (2009, 9). Consider: the propositional content of 
my belief that the moon is round gives me a reason (allows me to infer) that the moon is not square. 
What I believe, and the reasons behind my beliefs, are both a matter of propositional contents: 












then, there is an intimate relation between what we believe (an epistemic matter) and the meaning 
or content of our beliefs (a semantic matter). 
Brandom's pragmatic approach to reason resonates well with van Fraassen. For van Fraassen, talk of 
reason is a contextual matter. In particular, what counts as a reason depends on the context of 
dialogue. He writes: "[...] it is part of the structure of dialogue that I am meant to present something 
that I can reasonably believe would count as an inclining reason for you" (2011, 163). Here it seems 
that both Brandom and van Fraassen are interested in the same thing: the social practice of giving 
and asking for reasons. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that, in the "structure of dialogue" as in the 
"space of reasons", what would count as an "inclining reason" for you would be something inferred 
from the propositional content of your existing beliefs. This helps us to understand the role of 
shared value and factual opinion in facilitating value-based discussion. That is, if I share a 
background with my conversational opponent, then I can reveal to him commitments that follow 
from our common background of beliefs and values. In ethical and political discourse, for example, 
from the shared belief that women are people, my interlocutor and I might infer from this that, if we 
value equality for all people, we should commit to treating women equally to men, ensuring equal 
employment and education opportunities and so on. This is analogous to Brandom in that, in giving 
reasons, I am articulating inferences from the content of my beliefs, opinion, and values.  
Thus despite the semantic flavour of Brandom's project, for him the semantic and epistemic realms 
are interrelated and as such, his is a fitting model for our epistemic endeavours. Moreover, 
Brandom's dissolution of the semantic-epistemic distinction helps us to make sense of the social 
practice of giving and asking for reasons and how, in the context of dialogue and against a shared 
background, we might offer reasons for the value-based choices in van Fraassen's voluntarist 
epistemology and stance philosophy.  
2.3.3) Stance choice and epistemic decisions as expression 
At this point the reader may be wondering why we would willingly choose to commit ourselves to 
socially recognised norms, values, standards, or attitudes in the first place. That is, why would we 
adopt the requisite attitudes and seek recognition from our peers to commit ourselves to certain 
norms and values? Why opt for such obligation? Brandom addresses this quite clearly and his 
response has application in van Fraassen’s case. 
For Brandom, we willingly commit ourselves to semantic norms, and take on evaluative 












The positive expressive freedom, the freedom to do something, […] is obtainable only by 
constraining oneself by the […] norms implicit in discursive social practices […]. Speaking a 
particular language requires complying with a daunting variety of norms, rules, and 
standards. The result of failure to comply with enough of them is unintelligibility. […] But the 
kind of positive freedom one gets in return for constraining oneself in these multifarious 
ways is distinctive and remarkable (2009, 74).  
The kind of expression that Brandom is talking about here is linguistic expression. We commit 
ourselves to semantic and linguistic norms because we want to experience the concomitant wealth 
of expressive possibilities. As an English speaker, I recognise that "table" refers to tables and that the 
plural of "mouse" is "mice". I commit to these semantic norms because I want to be able to express 
intelligibly my thoughts about furniture and rodents (among other things) to others. This kind of 
expression is the benefit of being a speaker, of being part of a reciprocally recognised community of 
speakers, thus choosing to constrain ourselves by certain norms pays off with expressive power. 
We find something similar happening in van Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology. Consider his 
mention of the "information economy". As inquirers, we commit to and constrain ourselves by 
particular epistemic norms and values because doing so allows us to participate in  a knowledge-
based economy. Such participation in turn increases the scope of what we might know, since we can 
share, collaborate, debate, and discuss with fell w inquirers. By taking part in this sort of epistemic 
enterprise, we can take part in something greater than ourselves: we find our place in the collective 
epistemic enterprise and achieve together that which is impossible alone. This is the expressive 
benefit that comes from choosing to constrain ourselves by the epistemic norms and values of our 
current knowledge economy. Science is an example in this case. Scientists commit themselves to the 
standards and values of their particular community: they follow a certain method and seek particular 
kinds of evidence and explanation. By so constraining themselves, individual scientists are able to 
take part in the scientific community and to collaborate with fellow scientists on large-scale projects 
such as the Large Hadron Collider in Europe or the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) in South Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand. More often than not, collaborative projects pay off with greater 
epistemic yields than individual research. 
Philosophy is a similar example. Constraining ourselves by philosophical values (such as the value of 
rational debate) allows us to contribute to the philosophical conversation and to work together with 
other philosophers. Stance philosophy is a microcosm of this. If I choose the empirical stance, and 
commit myself to empirical values and so on, I can collaborate with other empiricist philosophers on 












scale collective project helps us, as individual philosophers, to contribute meaningfully to the 
discipline.  
We choose to constrain ourselves by certain norms and values (semantic or epistemic) because 
doing so brings the possibility for meaningful debate and exchanges with others. Just as committing 
to the semantic norms of a community of speakers allows us to communicate and share with others, 
committing to the epistemic norms of a community of inquirers allows us to collectivise our 
knowledge and to pursue greater goals of inquiry. 
Expression as self-expression: reflections on the jazz case 
There is also a sense in which choosing to commit ourselves to certain norms and values is in part an 
expression of self. Consider van Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology. For van Fraassen, our epistemic 
choices extend beyond the facts at hand: our decisions (whether we eschew all truth in the name of 
caution, say, or believe on the scantiest of evidence) are partly a matter of personal volition. It is in 
this way that, as van Fraassen writes, "[t]he element of personal decision, values and volition has 
entered and received a legitimate place in our epistemic life" (2002, 91).  
Of course, contextual concerns still influence and regulate our choices. Our current "information 
economy" for example, in which "certain sorts of information are much more valuable than others", 
is an example of a contextual factor that might influence our epistemic lives (van Fraassen, 2002, 
88). Indeed, in making any epistemic decision, we must recognise what is at stake and the value 
judgements involved. We must recognise, say, that in the current climate, information about interest 
rates and credit balances is considered more important than information about how many footsteps 
it takes to get to the bank. Nevertheless, while our epistemic choices might reflect the "information 
economy" of our current community, our decisions are still acts of will - of personal volition - and in 
this regard they are expressions of self that define who we are and could be as inquirers, 
philosophers, individuals.  
Likewise in the world of jazz, self-expression plays a significant role. For this reason, our earlier jazz 
example highlights a further similarity between van Fraassen’s voluntarism and Brandom’s reciprocal 
recognition. Say I am a fan of Charlie Parker. I do not appreciate him merely because he plays jazz 
saxophone; there are lots of jazz artists who play saxophone. Rather I appreciate Parker (as opposed 
to, say, John Coltrane or Sonny Rollins) because of the particular way in which he expresses himself 
through his instrument: his individual style, the particular embouchure he employs, the timbre he 
achieves. I appreciate his expression - the musical choices he makes, so to speak. We can look at this 












certain community recognises as 'jazz'. Over and above this, making music - jazz in particular - 
involves a kind of creative emphasis or artistic release. In this way playing jazz is a form of self-
expression, and it is this element of self-expression that makes, say, Parker's jazz different from 
Coltrane's. 
But what relevance does this have to van Fraassen’s voluntarism? Well, as we have seen in the jazz 
case, Brandom's reciprocal recognition has room for expressions of self. This is because individual 
autonomy is respected: as individuals, we have freedom over which attitudes we adopt and to which 
norms and values we commit ourselves. In as much as our self-expressive and volitional acts are 
attitude-dependent, then, they can be accommodated on the model of reciprocal recognition. In van 
Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology, then, while my epistemic choices must be recognised by others, 
they are still in part a matter of personal volition, an expression of self. Stance choice, for example, 
involves a degree of self-expression. Indeed, what is it that motivates me in choosing a particular 
epistemic stance over others, in committing myself to one set of standards and values over others, if 
not (at least in part) my individual volition? I commit to, say, the empirical stance over other 
philosophical stances because it is in the empirical stance - in the values and attitudes of the 
empiricist - that I find the greatest expression of who I am and who I want to be, as a philosopher 
and an individual. Here, reciprocal recognition helps us to make sense of our stance choice as an act 
of individual self-expression that is also, at the same time, socially recognised and hence not purely 
subjective. 
2.3.4) Brandom and van Fraassen in reflection 
Brandom's model of reciprocal recognition thus suggests an intersubjective understanding of norms 
and values that can accommodate van Fraassen's voluntarism while taking us away from pure 
subjectivity. That is, since Brandom's model respects individual autonomy, my epistemic decisions 
and stance choice remain a matter of will and personal volition. Importantly, however, these 
personal decisions and values must be recognised by the community that I, in turn, recognise as 
authoritative. This kind of reciprocally recognitive community gives us a dynamic and intersubjective 
understanding of individual choice and motivations, as well as the values and attitudes these choices 
reflect. Furthermore, we can extend the model of reciprocal recognition to accommodate the looser 
and less defined standards and values of, say, a jazz community. In this way, Brandom can account 
for our richer and less exact norms and values, those beyond the semantic realm.  
This is important when it comes to subjectivism in van Fraassen, since it shows that Brandom's 












based choices in van Fraassen's stance philosophy and voluntarist epistemology. Social recognition 
of our values and choices, moreover, offers a development on van Fraassen's "historical community 
of minds" and helps us to make sense of this community as a shared background of reciprocally 
recognised values and opinion. Furthermore, reciprocal recognition of our richer and more select 
values and choices within this overarching and historical community synthesizes smaller, more select 
communities (of empiricists, for example, or molecular biologists). This multi-layered sense of 
community thus helps us to understand how stance choice and values can be discussed, shared with, 
and recognised by others in our community.  
2.4) The relativist issue: enter Davidson 
I agree that mere pointing to the possibility of dialogue between stances will not 
serve me sufficiently (van Fraassen, 2007, 372) 
Reciprocal recognition thus offers some development on van Fraassen's "historical community of 
minds" by giving us recourse to socially recognised values and opinion. This adds an intersubjective 
element to the values, acts of personal volition, and individual choices that are present in his stance 
philosophy and voluntarist epistemology and in so doing, addresses subjectivist fears. Still, the 
question remains: how do we discuss and defend our values and choices to those who are outside 
our reciprocally recognitive community and thus, perhaps, do not share our background? How do we 
communicate across different communities?12 These concerns are reflective of Ho's relativist fear 
that value disagreements between different stances or communities will result in bribery, threats, 
seduction, and begging rather than rational discussion (2007, 330). Recall, van Fraassen's response 
to such relativist fears points us to the "real world", to "showing [our interlocutors] possibilities in 
the human condition", "opening new vistas for them" (2007, 378). But how exactly are we to go 
about showing possibilities or opening vistas to those outside our community?  
To this end, Donald Davidson gives us a way to think about the relativist issue and how it might be 
addressed in van Fraassen's "real world". As we shall see, a broadening of his principle of charity 
shows us how value-based discussion between different communities might proceed.  
2.4.1) Radical relativism and Ho's fear 
What is important for us to note, before we look at Davidson, is that Ho's fear is not one of radical 
community relativism or incommensurability. This is because, for Ho, we can and do acknowledge 
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the rival community as a community and its language as language. In our experience, that is, we can 
and do recognise those communities, languages, theories, and stances that are different from our 
own. As such, the issue is one of seemingly irresolvable value-based disagreement between 
communities rather than a case of unrecognisable forms of life, patterns of thought, or systems of 
language (to use Catherine Elgin's term, "unrecognisable intelligences" (1999, 92)). 
2.4.2) Davidson's principle of charity 
Charity is forced upon us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, 
we must count them right in most matters (Davidson, 1984, 197)  
Davidson (1984), through his version of the principle of charity, offers a model of rational discourse 
that helps us to make sense of how communication between communities might proceed in van 
Fraassen's case. Let us first consider the principle in its original context, namely, in relation to the 
task of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is the process of interpreting (the utterances of) 
someone or something who speaks a language that is radically different from our own. The main 
obstacle to this process is the interdependency of meaning and the propositional content of beliefs. 
As Davidson writes: 
A speaker who holds a sentence to be true on an occasion does so in part because of what 
he means, or would mean, by an utterance of that sentence, and in part because of what he 
believes. If all we have to go on is the fact of an honest utterance, we cannot infer the belief 
without knowing the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the 
belief (1984, 142).  
Here, the radical interpreter is trying to solve for two interrelated unknowns: meaning and belief 
(belief-content), on the basis of behavioural evidence alone; that is, on whether or not the speaker 
seems to "hold true" a particular sentence or utterance. Say we are in the process of interpreting a 
being called Alice. Without additional insight into either what she believes (the content of her 
beliefs) or the meaning of her utterances, we cannot move from a behavioural observation of what 
Alice seems to hold true to a claim about what she believes or what her utterances mean. Perhaps 
Alice holds true the utterance 'Il y a un vélo' when there is a bicycle in her vicinity. The 
interdependence here prevents us from taking this as evidence that Alice believes that there is a 
bicycle around. This is because, in order to ascribe this bicycle-related belief to Alice, we would need 
to know what her utterance means, and in order to know what her utterance means, it seems that 
we would need to know what she believes. Indeed, the same utterance and the same behaviour are 












fourth dimensional time-slice of a bicycle. Because of the interdependence of these two unknowns, 
meaning and belief, we have no way to interpret Alice.  
The principle of charity, however, infiltrates the circle of meaning and belief by "holding belief 
constant as far as possible while solving for meaning" (Davidson, 1984, 137). In other words, the 
principle lets us interpret some being as having beliefs that accord with our own, thus allowing us to 
make optimal sense of its utterances and behaviour. In our example, then, by applying the principle 
of charity, we ascribe to Alice those beliefs that we ourselves would have, were we in her position.13 
In effect this breaks the interdependence of meaning and belief, and thus allows us to charitably 
interpret the utterances of Alice.  
Our application of the principle is justified since, as Davidson writes, "disagreement and agreement 
alike are intelligible only against a background of massive agreement" (1984, 137). This shows us 
that the term 'principle of charity' is misleading: while our interpretation of Alice is a charitable one, 
our application of the principle itself is not. That is, it is not for the sake of charity and kindness that 
we assume Alice to share our beliefs; this assumption is necessary if we are to find her at all 
intelligible. That is, if we cannot find a way to interpret Alice's bicycle-talk as largely true (say, for 
example, she describes bicycles as friendly flying creatures), then we have no grounds for thinking 
that she is rational or that her bicycle-related beliefs are true: 
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that optimizes agreement should not be 
conceived as resting on a charitable assumption about human intelligence that might turn 
out to be false. If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a 
creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we 
have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything 
(Davidson, 1984, 137).  
For Davidson, then, it is through application of the principle of charity that radical interpretation 
(and hence, rational discourse) is possible. 
2.4.3) Broadening the principle: beliefs and values 
For Davidson, applying the principle of charity involves assuming a background of shared beliefs, 
against which interpretation and communication is possible. The empirical underpinning here is that 
                                                 
13
 Note that, since the principle operates as a holistic constraint, and since we ascribe to Alice only those 
beliefs that we (as fallible human beings) would have if we were in her situation, there is enough room for  












we, as rational human beings, share a "vast amount of agreement on plain matters" (Davidson, 
1984, 153). For our purposes, we might extend this agreement to include not just beliefs but also 
values and commitments. Broadening the principle of charity in this way opens the possibility for 
value-based communication and discussion.  
Consider: if I am trying to interpret, say, Alice's utterances, and her utterances include evaluative 
terms, then I need a broader sense of the principle of charity. That is, to perform fully my 
interpretative task, I need to assume a common background of shared beliefs and values. This makes 
sense in the context of shared, (human) physiological agreement. As humans, for example, we have 
common mammalian needs (for food, sleep, and shelter), aversions (to physical pain or discomfort) 
and desires (for companionship or security). These commonalities might beget certain shared values: 
say, we might value things that satisfy our basic needs or that fulfil our desires.  
This is one way in which we can make sense of van Fraassen's mention of "human communication" 
(2007, 378). Discussion between homo sapiens, value-based or otherwise, takes place against this 
background of widespread human agreement, comprising shared beliefs, values, commitments, 
needs, desires, and so forth. Such a common background gives us a means to discuss and further 
debate our value-based differences without resorting to bribery, seduction, and other such 
measures. That is, rather than bribe or threaten my opponent, I might show her how my stance or 
my community better fulfils our shared desire for, say, equality or better expresses our shared value 
of tolerance or peace. Broadening the principle of charity in this way helps us to elaborate van 
Fraassen's reference to "human communication" and, moreover, his talk of  "showing [...] 
possibilities in the human condition" (2007, 378).   
2.4.4) Opening new vistas: ambiguity and the principle of charity 
Davidson's principle of charity, then, promotes a sense of commonality that allows us to interpret 
and communicate with those outside our own community. Elgin (1999) further shows how 
application of the principle might foster communication. Her suggestion, as we shall see, also finds 
expression in van Fraassen's account.  
To complete the interpretative task, we must charitably assume agreement between us and the rival 
community; that is, we must apply the principle of charity. As Elgin suggests, this involves 
"construing seemingly shared terms as ambiguous" (1999, 90). Consider the case of Newtonian 
physics and the relativistic revolution. Einstein's theories of relativity brought about massive changes 
in our understanding of space, mass, and time. How might a relativistic physicist reconcile his new 












his own? Simply, he would apply the principle of charity: he would assume agreement between 
himself and the Newtonian physicist. For Elgin, this assumption, reconcil ing these two views, 
amounts to a charitable construal of common terms as ambiguous. To use her (1999) example: from 
his view, the relativistic physicist can recognise that the term 'mass' is ambiguous. While it appears 
in both relativity theory and classical physics, 'mass' has different meanings in each. In relativity 
theory, 'mass' refers to something variable; in classical physics, it usually refers to something 
constant (Elgin, 1999, 90). If we employ a richer scientific vocabulary that distinguishes between 
proper or rest mass (which is constant) and inertial mass (which is not), we can interpret classical 
theory from the relativistic viewpoint. That is, we can recognise that 'mass' in classical physics is 
ambiguous between proper mass and inertial mass whereas in relativity theory, mass refers just to 
inertial mass. Once this and other ambiguities are acknowledged, the apparent incommensurability 
between the two theories falls away, opening the possibility for communication (Elgin, 1999, 90).  
In The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen recognises a similar role for ambiguity (which he calls "our 
redeeming weakness" (2002, 145)) in reconciling rival stances or communities. The same case of 
classical Newtonian and relativistic physics, for van Fraassen, "shows that at least the most precise 
language about nature that we have, devised by the most precise of physical scientists, can harbour 
hidden ambiguities" (2002, 114). The same could be said of philosophical and "real world" discourse. 
Hence, acknowledging and resolving possible ambiguities in the case of our disagreements, value-
based or otherwise, might help us in assuming agreement with our rivals and thus enable us to 
communicate rationally with one another, rather than turning to bribery and other tactics.  Consider 
a stalemate between, say, a vegetarian and a non-vegetarian. Applying the principle of charity, we 
might assume that each values life and the absence of pain. Upon reflection, however, we might 
recognise ambiguities in their respective use of these terms. The vegetarian, that is, might take 'life' 
as any sentient life, and 'pain' as most forms of animalian pain. The non-vegetarian, by contrast, 
might understand 'life' as human life, or life with a certain level of sapience. The term 'pain' he might 
understand as solely human pain or perhaps unnecessary pain, where unnecessary is defined in 
relation to human necessity. Recognising these ambiguities in the face of a stalemate, more so than 
not, opens the gate for further discussion and debate and, possibly, resolution. 
As this suggests, identifying and resolving ambiguity is one way in which we might understand van 
Fraassen when he suggests "opening new vistas" for our conversational opponents, "about what the 
world is or could be like" (2007, 378). That is, the role of ambiguity here shows us that, just as our 












theories, the same vocabulary in philosophy or in the "real world", the same way of talking, can be 
compatible with many different ways of life. 
2.4.5) Davidson and van Fraassen in reflection 
In reflection, our discussion of Davidson and the principle of charity consisted of two parts. First, as 
we saw, the principle of charity grants us the assumption of commonality, of shared human 
agreement, between us and those outside our community. Importantly, by broadening the principle 
of charity, we can extend this agreement to the include not only shared beliefs but also shared 
values. Secondly, applying the principle of charity (that is, making sense of this agreement) is a 
matter of resolving ambiguity in our shared terms, including shared evaluative terms. In van 
Fraassen's language, we can understand this in terms of "human communication", as "opening new 
vistas", "showing [...] possibilities in the human condition" (2007, 378). This broad understanding of 
Davidson, together with Elgin's suggested role for ambiguity, thus helps us to make sense of van 
Fraassen's response to Ho's relativist fears and, moreover, his optimism over the possibility of value-
based discussion. 
2.5) Chapter summary 
Our aim in this chapter was to offer a possible response to subjectivist and relativist concerns with 
van Fraassen's stance philosophy and voluntarist epistemology. In this regard, we looked at van 
Fraassen's reference to community (his "historical community of minds" and knowledge economy) 
and sought to develop this using the work of Brandom and Davidson.  
To address the subjectivism issue, we looked at Brandom's model of reciprocal recognition. This 
gave us a description of how our norms gain their purport through a process of mutual recognition: I 
recognise a particular norm, and myself as responsible to this norm, just as others recognise me as in 
this way responsible and I in turn recognise them as authoritative in recognising me. Reciprocal 
recognition in this way synthesizes a community of norm-followers. We extended Brandom's model 
to include things like van Fraassen's values and attitudes. Here, reciprocal recognition provides an 
intersubjective account of these values and attitudes, and gives us recourse to a general community 
of like-minded beings (van Fraassen's "historical community of minds"). Reciprocal recognition of 
our more select values and attitudes within this greater community, moreover, synthesizes further 
more select communities (e.g. of empiricists, scientists, marathon runners). This gives us an 
intersubjective understanding of the richer and more select values and attitudes that underlie our 
stance choice and epistemic decisions, and helps us to make sense of how we might discuss these 












This left us with the issue of community relativism: how can we talk to beings from outside our own 
community? Davidson's radical interpretation and his principle of charity offered some insight. 
Davidson shows us that, if we want to interpret (and hence communicate with) those outside our 
community, then we must assume a shared background of agreement with them. Here, we 
broadened this agreement to include not only shared beliefs but also those shared values and 
commitments that might be common to us as humans. This gives us a way to read van Fraassen's 
reference to the "human condition" and "human communication" (2007, 378). Moreover, we 
considered the role of ambiguity in applying the principle of charity. This helps us to make sense of 
how we might resolve seeming disagreements by resolving hidden ambiguities in our shared terms. 
Our experience with scientific and conceptual revolutions is an example of this: that is, by resolving 
ambiguities in common terms, rival theories can be reconciled. We saw this in relati on to the term 
'mass' that appears in both classical Newtonian and relativistic physics. Resolving ambiguities when 
it comes to our shared evaluative terms, too, helps us to reconcile value-based disagreements and to 
"[open] new vistas", as van Fraassen suggests (2007, 378). 
Still, this takes for granted that we recognise these shared terms as terms rather than nonsense of 
absurd rabble. That is to say, there is still the matter of our initial encounter with a rival community 
and how we arrive at the stage of radical interpretation and disambiguation: how do we come to 
recognise - let alone interpret or disambiguate - the seemingly absurd terms and language or 
another stance or community? This is the issue of scientific and conceptual revolutions and we shall 













3.) Resolving the absurd: an emotional transition  
At the close of the previous chapter we considered Davidson's approach to the issue of community 
relativism. His radical interpretation and principle of charity shows us how to reconcile rival 
communities; however, his approach does not consider how we arrive at this stage. That is, for us to 
assume a shared background with someone requires us to take them seriously; it requires us to see 
their beliefs, values, language, community standards, and so forth as something other than absurd 
nonsense. Most often, this involves some kind of 'leap', a shift in perspective or a change in attitude, 
that prompts us to take seriously that which previously seemed absurd. For his part, van Fraassen 
explains this leap with reference to emotion (on Sartre's functional account), which he can 
accommodate within his voluntarist epistemology by virtue of his permissive rationality. Importantly 
for our concerns, emotion is something subjectively felt and thus, the place of emotion in van 
Fraassen's epistemology might renew fears of subjectivism. Nonetheless, as I hope to show in this 
chapter, there is some connection between community and van Fraassen's talk of emotion which 
might fend off the spectre of subjectivism.  
In The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen addresses emotion nd the leap to the absurd with reference 
to the drastic changes and shifts that typify scientific and conceptual revolutions. While this is an apt 
example, it does bring with it further issues (most obviously, whether there are in fact such 
revolutions) that muddy our consideration of the matter at hand: the role of emotion in van 
Fraassen's voluntarist epistemology, in particular the emotional leap that takes us from the 
nonsensical to the sensical and thus allows us to begin the process of disambiguation. For this 
reason, we shall consider the leap first in van Fraassen's own (revolutionary) terms and then again, 
in a more simplified context. We shall then consider a possible connection between emotion and 
community.  
3.1) The dual issue 
Making sense of the leap presents a dual issue. On the one hand, we have the prospective issue: 
how do we come to take seriously something that seems, from our current perspective, absurd 
nonsense? And on the other hand, we have the retrospective issue: having made the leap,  how do 
we now (retrospectively) legitimate it - since indeed, as van Fraassen writes, "we must be able to see 
our present as a rationally endorsable continuation of the past" (2002, 112)? The retrospective issue, 












past and present perspectives by disambiguating seemingly shared terms. Let us look at this briefly 
before addressing the prospective issue.  
3.2) The retrospective: ambiguity 
For van Fraassen, the retrospective issue of scientific and conceptual revolutions is one of 
recognising the post-revolutionary position as a "rationally endorsable continuation" of the prior 
position. This he calls the "royal succession" of science: 
[...] the posterior view brings with it a very clear understanding of the prior, now superseded 
theories. In this way it can grant them their proper place in the sun. Indeed, when it comes 
to 'royal succession' in science - the replacement of older successful theories by new rivals - 
the pretender to the throne must show, by its own lights, why the older theory was as 
successful as it was (2002, 115). 
One way to show this, as Elgin proposed, is through the disambiguation of shared terms. In classical 
Newtonian physics, to return to our earlier example, to say that mass is relative seems absurd. In 
relativity theory, however, it is only inertial mass that is relative rather than proper mass (which is 
constant, as in classical physics). For the Newtonian physicist, however, the phrase 'mass is relative' 
seems absurd since 'mass' can mean either inertial mass or proper mass interchangeably (van 
Fraassen, 2002, 112). Once we recognise this hidden ambiguity, we can explain the observed success 
of Newton's laws in cases where inertial mass and proper mass happen to be equal and as such, 
maintain the royal succession of science.  
3.3) The prospective: emotional transformation 
Before this, however, we have the prospective issue. This is the issue of understanding why and how 
we turn from our current position (or perspective or community or worldview) to something that 
seems absurd by our current standards. To explain the 'why', van Fraassen turns to Sartre's theory of 
emotions. For the 'how', as we shall see later, he introduces the notion of an 'unfollowable rule' that 
shows us how to revise our position when necessary. 
Let us ask: why do we turn towards the seemingly absurd? For van Fraassen, this revolutionary shift 
in perspective, coming to consider something which before was nonsensical to us, suggests a change 
in our value judgements. Think about the moments leading up to a scientific or conceptual 
revolution (the Kuhnian "time of crisis", as it were). Faced with growing anomalies and failing 












hypotheses. As such, we begin to question current theory, but to what end? From our current 
perspective and with our current value judgements, any alternatives to the status quo we cannot 
consider as anything but absurd or nonsensical. What is needed here  is a change in our value 
judgements such that we can revise our prima facie dismissal of these alternatives. It is this change 
that, for van Fraassen, is best explained through the lens of emotion: 
A change that makes intelligible something that was previously unintelligible must be in 
important part a change in attitude. If the change is not rationally compelled by the 
evidence but involves also an element of choice, we must note that it is a typical role of 
emotion to precipitate (or even mainly consist in) such a subjective transformation (2002, 
107).  
Consider the conditional here. Could this change be "rationally compelled by the evidence"? Given 
its nature, it could not. All that the evidence might suggest is that our current theory is in its death 
throes. When it comes to which of the seemingly absurd alternatives we should consider (if at all), 
the evidence is silent. This change is not something that is evidentially or rationally compelled nor is 
it open to "factual or theoretical deliberation" (van Fraassen, 2002, 143). Rather, the change in value 
judgement involves "an element of choice" and, as such, is prompted by emotion, subjectively felt.  
This transformative role of emotion was proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre in his (1939) Sketch for a 
Theory of Emotions:  
[Emotion] is a transformation of the world. When the paths before us become too difficult, 
or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer put up with such an exacting and difficult 
world. All ways are barred and nevertheless we must act. So then we try to change the 
world; that is, to live it as though the relations between things and their potentialities were 
not governed by deterministic processes but by magic. [...] The impossibility of finding a 
solution to the problem is apprehended objectively, as a quality of the world. This serves to 
motivate the new unreflective consciousness which now grasps the world differently, under 
a new aspect, and imposes a new behaviour [...] (1939, 63-5).  
Consider (as Sartre does) Pierre Janet's example of a patient who, when asked to confess to her 
therapist, instead "throws a fit of nerves" (Sartre, 1939, 69). She does not want to talk but the 
situation demands it. Her emotional reaction resolves the tension here by changing the situation, 
effectively "renouncing the act [of speech] as beyond her power" (1939, 70). "Now", Sartre writes, 
"and for as long as she is in tears and shaking with her sobbing, all possibility of speaking  is taken 












emotion (emotion as transformative) that van Fraassen uses to describe our experience of scientific 
and conceptual revolutions. When it comes to revolutions, that is, it is emotion (or "some analogue 
of" emotion) that transforms the situation, changing our value judgements such that the new 
perspective, previously unintelligible, now stands as a viable option (van Fraassen, 2002, 151).  
Importantly, if we are to understand scientific and conceptual revolutions as rational, we must be 
able to view this transformation as rationally endorsable (van Fraassen, 2002, 140). In van Fraassen's 
case, this looks possible, given the permissive rationality of his voluntarist epistemology. To make 
sense of this (how his position rationally accommodates such emotional transformations), we shall 
turn to a more mundane example than scientific revolutions.  
3.3.1) Emotion and epistemology 
In the third and fourth lectures of  The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen considers the role of emotion 
in his epistemology and how, through some kind of rationally endorsable emotional transformation, 
we can make rational sense of radical changes in perspective. His case-in-point is the phenomenon 
of scientific and conceptual revolutions and the drastic changes that are involved. This example is 
central to van Fraassen's book, since his is an epistemic project and explaining such revolutionary 
changes is a predominant epistemic concern. Nonetheless, revolutions present a complicated, if not 
controversial, case. As such, if we are to make sense of the place of emotion in van Fraassen's 
epistemology (and how it fits with his permissive rationality) we might do better to look at 
emotional change in a different context.  
The Jamesian example of interpersonal relationships is a possible starting point.14 Consider 
friendship. Certain people that we meet in life, we feel an amicable attraction towards. Sometimes 
we can explain this feeling (shared tastes or hobbies, similar humour) and other times we cannot. In 
the latter cases especially, it is often emotion that takes us from merely knowing someone to being 
their friend. We can look at this another way: making friends with someone requires us to assume, 
before logic or fact would allow, that this person is already a friend. We smile at them, we offer to 
share our food, we show them compassion, we listen to their stories with care. These kindly acts are 
not prompted by logic or fact, since we have no evidence as such that this person is or will be our 
friend. (Indeed, this would be a rather strange way to think about it: 'We became friends only when 
the evidence showed in favour of us forming a friendship'). Becoming friends with someone is thus 
not a matter of fact or logical compulsion; rather it involves a leap of sorts, an emotional transition. 
Our preliminary acts of friendship are prompted by a subjective feeling, an emotion as it were, that 
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we just 'like' this person. It is this feeling, and the behaviour that it brings, that takes us from 
acquaintancehood to true friendship. As James puts the point, "The desire for a certain kind of truth 
here brings about that special truth's existence" (1896, 24). For our current purposes, 'desire' here is 
a subjective feeling, a Sartrean emotion that transforms the situation and 'brings about' a friendship. 
Of course, making friends with someone is by no means comparable to a revolutionary change in 
world view; nevertheless this simple case can help us to understand how van Fraassen's voluntarism 
and his permissive rationality can accommodate emotional changes in belief. On van Fraassen’s 
account, recall, rationality is "but bridled irrationality" (2002, 92). For this reason, when it comes to 
such changes: 
[…] we can continue to view ourselves as acting reasonably - I should say, as acting in a way 
we can endorse to ourselves as reasonable. Changes in view are not rational because they 
are rationally compelled; they are rational exactly if they are rationally permitted, if they do 
not transgress the bounds of reason (2002, 92).  
Let us consider again our example. We experience some kind of subjective feeling towards someone 
that prompts us to assume a kinship with them. This change in view is not rationally compelled since 
neither fact nor logic enforces our change in perspective towards this person. That is to say, 
someone else, with logical and reasoning faculties similar to our own, need not experience the same 
feelings nor make the same assumption of friendship that we do. Nevertheless, on van Fraassen's 
permissive account, our change in view is rational in so much as it is not irrational.15 And certainly, it 
is not beyond the "bounds of reason" that, upon meeting someone new, we approach them as a 
friend.16  
3.3.2) Imagination and understanding emotion's transformative role 
By now we can appreciate that van Fraassen’s proposal that it is emotion that propels a change in 
view or perspective. We can also appreciate that such change can be accommodated on van 
Fraassen’s permissive account of rationality. Still, it does not follow that this change or the role 
played by emotion is fully understood. Here, Ward Jones on imagination gives us some reflection on 
the transformative role of emotion.  
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 Recall  that reason for van Fraassen is a contextual thing and as such the "bounds of reason" are determined 
by community, dialogue, or a similar intersubjective context. Of course, the "bounds of reason" may 
themselves change (as often happens during a revolution) but given van Fraassen's contextual understanding 
of reason, this change would presumably happen in a greater context than individual emotion or subjective 
whim.  
16
 That is unless, of course, they are wielding a knife in our direction and we hold the belief that knife-waving 












Jones suggests that it is our imagination that evokes an emotional transformation in perspective or 
belief: 
Consideration of [alternative theories] involves, among other things, imagining the world to 
be a certain way. Imagining a theory to be true is a matter of 'trying it on', of temporarily 
taking the world to be as the theory describes it to be. An imaginer can, of course, have 
emotional responses to her imaginings. She can be angered or saddened by them, feel 
satisfied or unsettled by them, be horrified or emboldened by them (2011, 134).  
So in our previous example, part of why my perception of someone changes from stranger or 
acquaintance to friend is that I imagine the situation as such. I 'try on' the friendship: I imagine what 
it might consist of or how this person might be like as a friend. In so doing, I prompt some kind of 
emotional reaction (happiness, perhaps, or contentment, or a desire for the situation to be realised, 
perhaps even disgust or revulsion). 
We can think of imagination as playing a similar part in other examples of radical belief change. As 
Jones suggests, switching to a vegetarian lifestyle might come about through an imaginative 
exercise, for example, imagining how I would feel if my family dog were to be slaughtered and 
served as food. What I feel as a result of this imagining might be enough to change my views on the 
current treatment of livestock animals or the relationship between humans and other animals. 
Religious conversion is another example that Jones gives. Non-believers might imagine (through 
reading certain texts or the confessions of others) what a life imbued with religious belief could feel 
like and, in so doing, experience a desire to explore such a life further (Jones, 2011, 135). In the case 
of scientific and conceptual revolutions, too, the suggestion of imagination helps us in understanding 
the emotional transition. Admittedly, while it might seem unlikely that we are in any position, before 
the revolution, to imagine the rival paradigm - indeed how can we imagine the absurd? - we could 
perhaps imagine taking seriously ("come to entertain" (van Fraassen, 2002, 73))  a theory that 
accounts for, in however strange and absurd a way, anomalies and experiences for which our own 
theory cannot. 
The capacity of imagination to elicit emotional changes is a possible start when it comes to making 
sense of these transformations and the suggested role of emotion in van Fraassen's voluntarist 
epistemology. That being said, there is still a way to go before such things are fully understood and 
as such this is a possible area for future work on van Fraassen's The Empirical Stance. For our current 
purposes, however, what is important is that emotion is an individual and subjective factor in van 












addressing this question, we must consider van Fraassen's notion of an 'unfollowable rule', a rule 
that is based in community and serves to guide emotional changes and revision.  
3.4) The prospective: the unfollowable rule 
Recall that the prospective issue with scientific revolutions was understanding why and how we turn 
towards something that seems absurd from our current position. As we have seen, van Fraassen's 
Sartrean account of emotion (emotion as transformative) attends to the 'why' question: emotion (or 
something like it) changes our judgement of what is or is not absurd such that we can approach 
something that previously we found nonsensical. Now we turn to the 'how' question: having opened 
ourselves to 'the absurd' - so to speak - how do we then adopt or take on this new perspective? To 
address this, van Fraassen presents the notion of a dual-purpose but 'unfollowable' rule, the 
empiricist version of which he calls the Sola experientia rule. This rule not o ly shows us how to 
revise our current perspective but also, as we shall see, offers some intersubjective backing to 
emotional transitions in van Fraassen's epistemology.  
Let us consider this Sola experientia rule. Literally, 'sola experientia' translates to 'experience alone' 
and this, according to van Fraassen, serves as the mantra for classical (naive) empiricism. As an 
epistemic rule, Sola experientia prescribes that "any claim to knowledge, any support for opinion, 
must come from experience; experience trumps all" (2002, 120). At first blush the rule seems simple 
enough, but following it presents a three-fold difficulty: how do we identify what 'experience' is, 
how do we interpret it, and what do we take from it? As it is we cannot apply the Sola experientia 
rule until these three questions have been settled yet in order to settle these questions we must first 
identify, interpret, and extrapolate with regards to experience (2002, 125). This is troublesome 
since, as the history of empiricism shows us, there are many things we might identify as 'experience' 
and many ways we might interpret or extrapolate from this 'experience'. Moreover, any choice 
between these alternatives (how we identify, interpret, or extrapolate from experience) must be 
based on experience, since experience trumps all. Here, however, this is an impossible request 
because the subject of choice is experience itself; hence, the rule is unfollowable (van Fraassen, 
2002, 126).  
So what use is an unfollowable rule? As it turns out, the seemingly paradoxical nature of the Sola 
experientia rule gives it a dual purpose. Its "first and most obvious role" is to "strengthen and 
maintain tradition" (van Fraassen, 2002, 141). That is, if we put aside for the moment the trouble of 












and understanding of 'experience' currently in place as a result of the empiricist tradition. This is the 
message in van Fraassen's mariner story:  
We must accept that, like Neurath's mariner at sea, we are historically situated. We rely and 
must rely on our pre-understanding, our own language, and our prior opinion as they are 
now and go on from there. Rationality will consist not in having a specially good starting 
point but in how well we criticize, amend, and update our given condition (2002, 139).  
As this story shows, we have already a "pre-understanding", a "prior opinion", of how to identify and 
interpret experience, and what we can extrapolate from it. In its primary role, the Sola experientia 
rule serves to maintain this pre-understanding and prior opinion and to keep the status quo.  
For the most part, this is enough; however, when existing understanding fails us (the Kuhnian "time 
of crisis") and it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain tradition, the Sola experientia rule 
switches function. In its secondary role, rather than maintain and support tradition, the Sola 
experientia serves to undermine any aspect of current understanding or theory that might be 
considered interpretative. Here, the rule operates in full awareness of the 'experience alone' 
constraint, sifting through the layers of current theory and discarding ("devaluing") anything that is 
interpretative or extrapolative, to arrive at a new and pure empiricism (2002, 142). This secondary 
role of the Sola experientia addresses the 'how' part of the prospective issue in that it gives us the 
means to revise and change our current perspective, to "peel off layer after layer, possibly leaving 
nothing intact in the end" (van Fraassen, 2002, 142).17 
Let us consider this in reference to classical Newtonian physics and the rise of Einstein's theories of 
relativity. In the heyday of classical physics, before Newton's laws begin to show strain, the Sola 
experientia rule serves to maintain the Newtonian tradition. Around the turn of the twentieth 
century, however, it becomes apparent that Newtonian physics is in trouble as its calculations fail to 
predict accurately the movements of astronomical bodies or the behaviour of quantum-sized 
particles. Modern science stands in crisis. The Sola experientia rule now switches to its secondary 
revisionary function, thus providing the young Einstein with the means to critique the science of the 
day, in particular its adherence to absolute space and time. Indeed it is in this way that popular 
science texts often illustrate the downfall of classical physics, as van Fraassen demonstrates: 
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 Admittedly there might seem to be an element of false consciousness or "double-think" in the dual -purpose 
Sola experientia and as such, we may struggle to make sense of it as a rule at all  rather than a dictum with two 
"quite separate" applications (2002, 142). As far as van Fraassen is concerned, however, this struggle is purely 
philosophical. "Happily", he writes, "it's only philosophers who take ideas to their logical extreme, and happily 
no one listens to philosophers when they do. In the hands of reasonable people, this dual -role is actually a 












"'Newton [and his followers] did not arrive at Einstein's relativity because, enslaved by old ideas and 
seeing his own results with myopic eyes, he extrapolated his facts in a biased way. Einstein pointed 
out how Newton had gone beyond the deliverances of experience, removed Newton's metaphysical 
additions, and thus made way for the right theory, truly true to experience'" (2002, 141-2). 
3.4.1) Emotion and the unfollowable rule 
Now we have some appreciation of the two functions of the unfollowable rule (to maintain tradition 
and to break it down) but how do we switch from one to the other? For van Fraassen, this switch 
involves a change in value judgement and as we have seen, such a change is best understood "under 
the heading of emotion, not as factual or theoretical deliberation" (2002, 143). We can make sense 
of this as so: for the most part, we follow the rule as it is, based on our current interpretation of 
'experience', until this interpretation begins to fail us. The tension and frustrations of struggling to 
maintain a defunct tradition prompt an emotional shift in the situation. Now, following the Sola 
experientia rule is a matter of revising interpretation and changing tradition. In this way, the 
transformative power of emotion takes us from following the rule to maintain the orthodoxy, to 
using it as a means to revise our current position.  
Further reflection on the connection between emotion and van Fraassen's unfollowable rule brings 
us to our previous theme of community and intersubjectivity. In van Fraassen's voluntarism, recall, 
emotion is a subjective and individual matter such that people may or may not experience emotional 
transitions at different times or for different reasons. What changes my worldview (and when) might 
be completely different to what changes yours. Someone who is a risk-taker, say, might experience a 
shift in perspective before a dogmatic type might. Similarly, a more trusting person might assume 
kinship with strangers where others would not. But how does this relate to our consideration of 
community? As we shall see, these subjective changes relate to community through the 
unfollowable rule. It is the unfollowable rule, operating in the context of community, that allows us 
as community members to change and revise current perspective.  
In this way, the unfollowable rule might give some intersubjective backing to an otherwise subjective 
and personal emotional transition. Of course, the initial shift in perspective (whereby we 
acknowledge the dual function of the unfollowable rule) is and must be a subjective matter, but 
when it comes to applying the Sola experientia in its revisionary role, instigating "reasoned and 
proportionate change" within the community is an intersubjective affair. Within a community, 
revising current opinion and theory quite probably takes the form of intersubjective activities such 












community, is a matter of politics in the broad sense of the term, of negotiation and dispute, strife 
and reconciliation [...]" (2002, 142-3). In some way, then, we can find a sense of community and 
intersubjectivity in van Fraassen's talk of emotion and emotional transition. 
If we can accept the seemingly paradoxical notion of an unfollowable rule in van Fraassen's 
voluntarist epistemology, then we shall be rewarded with a rule that both maintains and (when 
necessary) defies tradition. This dual-purpose rule helps us to make further sense of drastic changes 
and revision in our perspective or worldview and also brings an element of intersubjectivity to what 
is otherwise an emotional and subjective transition. 
3.4.2) Brandom and the unfollowable rule 
Briefly we might reflect on a possible parallel between van Fraassen's unfollowable rule and our 
earlier discussion of Brandom and reciprocal recognition. For Brandom, recall, being a rule-follower 
(that is, achieving normative status) is a matter of reciprocal recognition. This two-part process 
weaves together an account of authority and responsibility in relation to a particular norm or rule: I 
am authoritative over which rule I recognise myself as responsible to, just as you are authoritative in 
recognising me as responsible and I am authoritative in recognising your recognition as 
authoritative. The symmetry of authority and responsibility here gives a sense in which we, as rule-
followers, both make (authorise) and take (are responsible to) the rules we follow.  
There seems a possible similarity here to the unfollowable rule. When I apply the rule in its first 
function, to maintain tradition, I am not explicitly recognising its interpretative element. That is, I  am 
not explicitly recognising that I have authority ( in that I can interpret the rule) in whether or not I 
recognise the rule in this way. However, when I apply the rule in its secondary function, to defy and 
revise tradition, I do recognise its alternative interpretations and my authority in this regard. 
Through my recognition, I am "making it the case" that these interpretations are correct, "by taking 
it to be the case that they are" (Brandom, 2009, 93). Here, I am still a rule-follower in that I am still 
recognising the rule as authoritative, and myself as responsible thereto. I am simply exercising my 
authority in recognising one interpretation of the rule rather than another as authoritative. The 
reciprocity of making and taking here, of authority and responsibility, gives us a dynamic 
understanding of rule-following. 
Brandom's model thus shows how we can both make (interpret) and take a rule; that is, how we can 
be both authoritative over and responsible to (a particular interpretation of) a rule.  This might give 
us a way to understand better the dual nature of van Fraassen’s unfollowable rule: that is, for the 












'experience'. We do not consider its dual function nor the interpretative element that is present. 
However, when we do acknowledge these things - during a time of crisis - we can 'make' the rule 
anew, revising our current interpretation of 'experience' and hence the Sola experientia itself. The 
fluid notion of rule-following that Brandom's model of reciprocal recognition offers us thus sheds 
some light on how we might understand the unfollowable rule in operation. 
Brandom's model is a social one, moreover. That is, to be a rule-follower I must be recognised by 
others as such. When I 'make' a rule, my authority here (my interpretation of the rule) and my 
'taking' of the rule must be recognised by others if the exercise is to count for anything. I cannot 
simply re-interpret and apply a rule at whim; fellow community members must acknowledge my re-
interpreted rule and that I am following it. (Brandom: "[s]omeone becomes responsible only when 
others hold him responsible, and exercises authority only when others acknowledge that authority" 
(2009, 70)). This suggests that further reflection on the possible connection between Brandom's 
reciprocal rule-following and the unfollowable rule might help us to make fuller sense of van 
Fraassen's account in terms of intersubjectivity and community. I leave this as a possible avenue for 
future work.   
3.5) Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we looked at drastic changes in belief or perspective. These changes pose a challenge 
in traditional epistemology, since they typically involve some kind of 'leap' that gives us a different 
perspective, a perspective that appears absurd from our current position. Van Fraassen's voluntarist 
epistemology, however, can accommodate this leap, partly as a result of his permissive account of 
rationality. For van Fraassen, what is rational is what is not irrational. Changes in view are thus 
rationally permitted provided that the new view is not irrational nor does it commit "self-sabotage", 
to use van Fraassen's term (2007, 354). 
To explain why such changes take place, we looked at the role of emotion in van Fraassen's 
epistemology. Following Sartre, van Fraassen gives a functional account of emotion, whereby 
emotion transforms our situation such that what once seemed nonsensical now makes sense. 
Emotion is thus one possible way in which we might "come to entertain" a belief that we once found 
absurd and hence change our perspective (van Fraassen, 2002, 73).  
Given that emotion and emotional transitions are subjective things, they seem to stand apart from 
our concerns with community and intersubjectivity. Nonetheless, we did find some connection 
between emotion in van Fraassen and the theme of community, in the  form of the 'unfollowable 












'unfollowable', rule that both maintains tradition (the current perspective) and serves as a means to 
undermine it. As we saw, switching between the two functions of the unfollowable rule requires an 
emotional transition. At the same time, it is the rule in its secondary function that helps us to change 
and revise current perspective. That is, it is through emotion that we acknowledge the revisionary 
function of the unfollowable rule, however, in making the necessary revisions, we follow the rule 
itself rather than our emotional (and subjective) whim. More importantly, we suggested, rule-
following here is in part a community matter and hence, the connection between emotion and the 
unfollowable rule adds an intersubjective element to van Fraassen's talk of emotions in 
epistemology.  
We then considered van Fraassen's unfollowable rule in relation to Brandom's model of reciprocal 
recognition. We suggested this as a possible avenue for future work, since Brandom offers a dynamic 
account of rule-following that seems to have parallels to the Sola experientia. Specifically, the 
reciprocity of authority and responsibility, of 'making' and 'taking' a rule, may help us to further 
understand the dual function of van Fraassen's rule. The social element of Brandom's model, 
moreover, would lend support to our suggestion that the unfollowable rule provides an 












4.) Final reflections 
As I hope to have shown, there is an underdeveloped role for community in van Fraassen's The 
Empirical Stance. Importantly, the themes of community and intersubjectivity, when read into van 
Fraassen's work, give us some recourse against subjectivist and relativist worries.  
Van Fraassen's voluntarist position, as we saw, admits the presence of values, attitudes, and 
personal volition in our epistemic and philosophical lives. Our philosophical position, or "stance", is 
thus more than a factual thesis; it is an expression of who we are and who we want to be.  For some 
(Ho, Jauernig), this presents an undesirable view of philosophy in that it suggests that a philosophical 
claim is akin to a subjective expression of personal preference (worries of subjectivism). Moreover, if 
our epistemic claims and choices reflect our individual values and volition, how are we to discuss 
these claims and choices with others who perhaps do not share our values (worries of relativism)?  
To address subjectivist concerns, we looked at Brandom's model of reciprocal recognition. 
Reciprocal recognition, remember, is the dynamic process of recognising and being recognised: I 
recognise and choose to be responsible to a particular value, just as you must recognise me as 
responsible to this value, and just as I must recognise your recognition as authoritative. It is in this 
way that I choose and commit to a particular value. Here the social reciprocity of our authority and 
responsibility introduces an intersubjective aspect to our values and choices. Importantly, on this 
model, van Fraassen's voluntarism is respected since I have authority over which values I choose to 
take on or be responsible to; nevertheless these values and choices, while my own, are not purely 
subjective since they gain some of their purport from the process of reciprocal recognition. This 
suggests that our otherwise subjective values and choices are in part intersubjective, thus quelling 
fears of subjectivism.  
This brought us to the issue of community relativism and the possibility of value-based discussion: 
that is, how do we recognise, and hence discuss, the values and value-based choices of those outside 
of our reciprocally recognitive community? Conversely, how can I discuss and defend my values and 
choices to others, if they do not recognise or share my values as such? Davidson provided insight 
here. His principle of charity, especially, gives us a way to interpret others, and hence communicate 
with them, by assuming a shared background of widespread agreement. Extending this agreement 
to include not only beliefs but also things like values and commitments helps us to understand van 
Fraassen's optimism ("showing [...] possibilities" (2007, 378)) when it comes to debating and 












involves recognising and resolving hidden ambiguities in shared terms, including our evaluative 
terms. Resolving ambiguities opens the way for further discussion and debate, as van Fraassen 
writes, "opening new vistas" (2007, 378). Davidson's radical interpretation and principle of charity 
thus help us to make sense of van Fraassen's optimism in his response to fears of community 
relativism and value-based disagreement.   
We then considered the shift in perspective that allows us to approach a rival community as  such, 
such that we can apply Davidson's principle. That is, at first glance, the values, standards, and 
methods of another community might appear absurd to us. In these cases, before we can apply the 
principle of charity and hence interpret and communicate with this other community, we must first 
be able to recognise their value judgements and beliefs as such, rather than absurd babble. As we 
saw, taking seriously something that seems absurd requires us to make a leap of sorts, to change our 
perspective or value judgements. Van Fraassen explains this change with the help of Sartre's theory 
of emotion, in which emotion is something transformative. For van Fraassen, then, it is through 
some kind of emotional change or transformation that we experience a shift in our perspective or a 
change in our values. Importantly for our purposes, an emotional transformation is a subjective and 
personal experience, and as such seems somewhat apart from our community-based concerns. 
Nonetheless, upon further reflection, there is some connection between the role of emotion in van 
Fraassen and his notion of the community-based unfollowable rule. That is, while it is emotion that 
first turns us towards the absurd, the process whereby we revise and change our standards and 
value judgements is conducted through application of the unfollowable rule, which itself operates 
within a community. This connection suggests a possible intersubjective element to what is 
otherwise a subjective and emotional experience.  
As I hope to have shown, an intersubjective reading of van Fraassen's The Empirical Stance gives us 
some recourse from subjectivist and relativist concerns and in so doing, helps us to appreciate better 
his voluntarist project. Possible avenues for future work include further reflection on van Fraassen's 
unfollowable rule, particularly in relation to Brandom's social account of rule -following. This may 
give us further insight into the connections between emotion, community, and the unfollowable rule 
which, in turn, may help us to make better sense of the role of the individual within the epistemic 
community and his relationship to the community during times of change. Another possible (and 
more general) avenue is the suggested role of emotion in epistemology. Ward Jones' mention of 
imagination as a possible catalyst for emotional transitions is a start in this regard and further 
reflection may improve our understanding of the place of individual volition and choice in van 
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